Impact of Urbanization on Japanese Voter Preferences: 1955-1967 by Lee, Lisa Reames
THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION ON JAPANESE VOTER 
PREFERENCES: 1955-1967 
By 
LISA REAMES LEE 
I/ 
Bachelor of Arts 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1978 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
December, 1980 
THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION ON JAPANESE VOTER 
PREFERENCES: 1955-1967 
Thesis Approved: 
· Thesis Adviser 
o=~a,fl~ 
~~ 




This study concerns the effect of urbanization on Japanese voter 
preferences during the period 1955-1967. Prefectural voting returns for 
the five House of Representatives elections, held during these years, 
were utilized in the analysis of urban and rural voter preferences. The 
primary objective was to determine whether differences exist between 
urban and rural voter preferences and, if so, to what extent changes in 
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DEFINITION OF PURPOSE AND PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Urbanization is one of the most important and dominant demographic 
f . 1 currents o our time. World urbanization has progressed dramatically. 
It is estimated that not more than 3 per cent of the world's population 
could have been considered urban in 1800. At the beginning of this 
century, only one nation, Great Britian, could be regarded as an urban-
ized society in the sense that more than one half of its residents 
resided in cities. By 1965, there were at least 30 such nations. 2 And 
in 1970, 39 per cent of the world's population was urban. Of this, 23.8 
per cent resided in urban areas of 100,000 or more inhabitants. 3 The 
present degree of world urbanization is both very recent and totally un-
precedented. The global level of urbanization continues to rise 
rapidly. 4 
As world urbanization progresses, it must have some profound social 
and political consequences. This study will attempt to explain the 
political implications of increased urbanization by studying Japanese 
voting patterns. The principle purpose of this examination is to deter-
mine what the effects of urbanization are, if any, on Japanese voter 
preference. 
Japan presents an ideal situation for studying urbanization and 
voter preference because Japan has been one of the world's most rapidly 
1 
2 
urbanizing nations. In the first really modern census taken in 1920. 
only 18.1 per cent of Japan's total population lived in cities. By 1930, 
this figure had increased to 24.1 per cent; by 1940, to 37.9 per cent; by 
5 1960, to 63.6 per cent; and by 1975, to 75.9 per cent. Japan continues 
to urbanize. It is projected that 99 million Japanese will live in urban 
areas by the year 2000. Further, it is projected that by the year 2000, 
two Japanese cit:Les, Tokyo and Osaka, will be among the 10 largest cities 
in the world. 6 For these reasons, urbanization continues to be a major 
concern of the Japanese government. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is presently the governing party. 
The LDP, also known as the Jiyuminshuto, has for the past 25 years 
dominated the Japanese political scene. The party's continuous control 
of the government repres.ents a unique success story among the world's 
democratic systems; no other major country has a matching record of 
political authority. 7 The opposition parties have not been able to pose 
a serious threat to the LDP's control. 
However, over the past several years, the LDP has suffered a notice-
able decline in its electoral strength in both houses of the Diet, the 
Japanese Parliament. In 1976, the LDP lost its majority in the House 
of Representatives, the lower house of the Diet. The party was able to 
recruit some independent winners and thereby retain its majority. In 
1979, the LDP again lost its majority. It won 248 seats out of a pas-
sible 511. But again, the party was able to recruit enough independents 
to regain control. 
With LDP's electoral decline, have come forecasts of impending 
disaster for the party. Prior to each national election, predictions 
of a new era in Japanese politics are made; an era of coalition politics. 
3 
Articles such as Matsushita Keiichi's 11A New Liberalism in Prospect" and 
Margaret A. McKean's "Japan's Beleaguered Ruling Party" have predicted 
the downfall of the LDP and the emergence of a socialist coalition. 8 
These predictions have, as yet, been premature because the LDP has man-
aged to retain control. And in the unusual election of June 1980, the 
LDP made what has been termed a "remarkable com·eback. 11 The party won 
286 of the 511 seats in the House of Representatives; a gain of 38 seats. 
Because it is so difficult to predict future occurrences in 
Japanese politics, it would perhaps be helpful to look at the early years 
of the present major political parties to see if some insight into voter 
preference and electoral support may be gained. This study is concerned 
with the early years of the major political parties, 1955-1967. 
The period 1955-1967 was a crucial one for Japanese political 
parties and Japanese politics. It was during these years that the 
Liberal Party and the Democratic Party merged to form the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party and the left and right wings of the Socialist Party merged, 
only to split into the Japanese Socialist Party and the Democratic 
Socialist Party in 1959. This period also saw the emergence of the 
Japanese Communist Party as a legitimate political force and the creation 
of the Komeito. 
The question that arises is why was this particular period so vital 
in the development of Japanese political parties? This period was not 
only one of political party development but it was also one of increas-
ing urbanization. Since these phenomenons occurred at much the same 
time, it has been theorized that the two are related in some manner. 
In the study of Japanese politics and Japanese political parties, 
the following statements are frequently made concerning the relationship 
4 
·of urbanization and voter preference: (a) "The Liberal Democratic Party 
is a rural-based party, 119 (b) "The Liberal Democratic Party is dispropor-
tionately dependent on over-valued rural seats, 1110 and (c) "Urbanization 
results in an urban population that is more receptive to political in-
novation than the rural population."11 The implication in these state-
ments is that the urban and rural voters have differences in their voting 
preferences. And further, that rural voters should be attracted to con-
servative parties while urban voters should be attracted to progressive 
parties. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of these 
assumptions and to try to determine the relationship between urbanization 
and voter preference. 
This chapter will review the existing literature on the impact of 
urbanization and voter participation and will describe the data and 
methods used to test the impact of urbanization, which will be examined 
in Chapter V. Chapter II describes the origin and development of the 
major Japanese political parties active during the period 1955-1967. It 
will also briefly describe the system of Japanese elections. Chapter 
III discusses the process of Japanese urbanization while Chapter IV 
describes the basic theories concerning urbanization and political 
participation. 
Design of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the utility of urbanization 
as a predictor of voting preference. The method used in the investiga-
tion of this problem was to examine the perfectural voting returns for 
the five House of Representative elections held during the period 1955-
1967. A prefecture is a regional devision which has its own government. 
5 
Japan has had a tradition of centralization in the government and al-
though the United States occupiers tried to introduce local autonomy, 
the tradition continued. 
Each prefecture will be defined in terms of its urban/rural charac-
teristics. Then the results of the five elections will be assessed to 
determine what relationship exists between urbanization and voter 
preference in Japan. 
The data for this study comes from the Data Confrontation Seminar 
E.!!... the Use ~ Ecological Data in Comparative Cross-National Research, 
1969. The data was made available through the Inter-University Con--
sortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Japan, 1949-
1968, was supplied by Michitoshi Takabataki, Department of Political 
Science, Rikkyo University, Tokyo. 
As a general framework for this study, it will be necessary only to 
define certain concepts. For the purposes of this study, "urbanization" 
will be defined as the process by which, through both migration and 
natural increase, increasing numbers or proportions of a society's 
inhabitants become residents of cities. James W. White's definition of 
a city will be used. He defines a "city" as "a relatively large, dense, 
and permanent settlement of a socially heterogeneous individuals, a 
relatively large proportion of whom are engaged in none agricultural 
. 1112 occupations. 
Statement of Problem 
To the extent that this study suggests explanations concerning the 
impact of urbanization on voter preference in Japan, the following 
assumptions are proposed for study: 
6 
In Japan, the place of residence seems to have an impact on voter 
preferences. There are differences between urban and rural voter prefer-
ences. Urban and rural voters have different political needs and demands 
and some of these are the result of urbanization. Urban voters have been 
concerned with issues such as air pollution, inadequate housing, and mass 
transit. These are not the issues that have been of primary interest to 
rural residents. Rural voters have been more concerned with agricultural 
supports and the improvement of the quality of rural life. 
The responses of the major political parties to the needs of urban 
and rural voters vary. Obviously, voters will tend to be attracted to 
the party which is most willing and capable of meeting their demands. 
In Japan, the rural voters tend to be attracted to the conservative 
parties which have traditionally advocated policies which appeal to rural 
interests. Urban voters tend to be attracted to the more progressive 
parties which have been most responsive to their needs. 
As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture change, it would 
be expectErl that there would be a corresponding shift in voter prefer-
ence. Increasing levels of urbanization should result. in additional 
f h . . 13 support or t e more progressive parties. 
Review of the Literature 
Urbanization and its effect on political participation have been 
subjects of interest for researchers for a number of years. Much has 
been written on this sub_i ect, but the point must be made that there is 
little consensus on the possible impacts or effects of urbanization on 
political behavior. The following is meant only to provide a very 
general overview of the basic trends in the literature concerning 
7 
urbanization. The early studies or urbanization were primarily concerned 
with the sociological implication of the urban process. The early 
approaches were descriptive in nature. They described the character-
istics of folk or traditional societies and the characteristics of urban 
society and then comparisons were made between the two. 14 The differ-
ences between the two types of societies were thought to be so profound 
that any migrant would suffer severe shock. 15 
Later studies began to investigate the political implications of 
urbanization. One of the pioneers in this type of society was Daniel 
Lerner. In his work of the late 19SO's, he assigned a primary role to 
urbanization in the process of political participation. He hypothesized 
that urbanization led to literacy, which led to media consumption, which 
in turn was related to political participation. Other scholars sub-
sequently analyzed these presumed causal relationships and though they 
came up with somewhat different patterns, they still attributed a major 
. 1 b . . 16 primary ro e to ur an1zat1on. 
As the behavioral approach in political science gained acceptance, 
the studies concerning the political implications of urbanization 
adopted this new approach. Statistical analyses of voting behavior and 
other forms of political participation were undertaken to gain some 
insight into the relationships of urbanization and political participa-
tion. A well known study, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt's "Social Structure 
and Political Participation," tested modernization theory with survey 
data on the political behavior of individuals from urban and rural areas 
in five countries. Their primary goal was to determine what factors 
influence political participation. Their findings will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
8 
Other studies have been particularly concerned with the impact of 
urbanization on migrants. Many of these studies have dealt with Latin 
American cities. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., in particular, has examined 
urbanization as an element of Latin American political instability. 
Other studies have dealt with specific nations and have examined voter 
turnouts and their relationships to urbanization. These studies will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
Studies dealing specifically with the political implications of 
urbanization on voting behavior have generally been limited to a single 
community or other limited area or region. For example, in Political 
Implications of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, 
James White analyzed the effects of urban migration in the community of 
Uji. The problems with such studies are obvious. The findings may not 
be applicable when they are generalized to the national level. 
Studies concerning political participation in Japan have relied 
primarily on voting statistics and opinion surveys. Bradley Richardson 
and Robert E. Ward, among others, have utilized these sources of infor-
mation to study political participation, political culture, and political 
socialization. Recent studies such as the one by Gary Allinson, 
Suburban Tokyo, have been concerned with political behavior in Japanese 
suburbs. Interest in this facet of Japanese politics is growing. While 
these studies are limited in their general scope, they do provide valu-
able information concerning urbanization and political participation. 
FOOTNOTES 
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Ward, p. 44. 
12Wh. ite, p. 7. 
13 The terms progressive and conservative are not meant to imply any 
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Japanese politics commonly utilize these terms and their use in the study 
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14For a list of these characteristics see White, p. 57. 
9 
1 5whit e , p • 9 • 
16samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice 
(Cambridge, 1976), p. 47). 
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CHAPTER II 
JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
Introduction 
The 11Meiji Restoration" of 1868 marks the beginning of the era of 
modern Japanese political history. The ruling shogunate was replaced by 
a small group of oligarchs who exercised political power for the "re-
stored" Meiji Emperor. Other leaders, who had been left out of the new 
government,. demanded that a representative parliament be established. 
In addition, the dissidents asked for a constitution and for limited 
suffrage. 
. d 1 organize • 
In order to achieve their demands, political parties were 
The oligarchs in the government initially opposed the 
2 
parties but the parties eventually proved too powerful to oppose. A 
constitution, the gift of the Meiji Emperor, was promulgated in 1889. 
Modeled after the autocratic Prussian Constitution, it provided for a 
house of representatives with elected representatives. 
Political parties continued to develop and they reached their 
ascendency after World War I. Although the Emperor was, under the 1889 
Constitution, the ultimate authority, many of his powers were exercised 
through the Prime Minister. During the period from 1918 to 1932, the 
leaders of the two conservative parties, the Friends of Constitutional 
Government Association and the Constitutional Association, led nine of 
the 12 cabinets. 3 
11 
In the 1930's, however, the political parties began to decline. 
There was no systematic organization of the parties. They were not 
mass-based parties; they were instead based on a rather complex system 
of loyalty to an individual leader. The average citizen would not 
identify himself with a party directly. 4 Political parties were not 
compatible with the cultural setting of the individual and they failed 
12 
to respond to the public's needs and demands. And the endless mudsling-
ing among the immature political parties and the frequent political 
scandals resulted in a national distrust of political parties. 5 As the 
people felt no real attachment to the parties, they were easily dis-
missed. The parties continued to exist and occasional elections were 
held but they were not powerful. Others exercised authority for the 
Emperor. The military, during this period, had steadily gained power 
and in 1940 the political parties were abolished and replaced by the 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association. 6 
During the decade after World War II, there existed at one time 
or another 17 conservative parties, each with a rather brief life span 
or with a frequent change in name or membership, merging with or 
splitting from others, and party switches by their members were fre-
7 quent. From the postwar elections held in 1946 until 1955, political 
power shifted among the various political parties. These parties were 
nothing more than cliques of new politicans clustered around a leader 
with access to funds, political experience, and with ambitions for 
leadership. 8 The personality of the leader was the most important 
factor in the development of these political parties. 9 Figures 1 and 2 
illustrate the genealogy of the postwar reform and conservative parties. 
JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY 
(Ncw.1945) 
. I LABOR PEASANT PARTY r- (Dec.1945) 
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Figure 1. Genealogy of Postwar.Refonn Parties 
13 
jAPAN LIBERAL . PARTY Nov 1945 JAPAN f:IROGRESSIVE PARTY Nov 1945 
I 
JAPAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY Mar 1947 
DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTY Mar 1948 
JAPAN COOPERATIVE PARTY Dec 1945 
~NATIONAL PARTY. 
NATIONAL COOPERATIVE PARTY Mar 1947 
COALITION FACTION OPPOSITION FACT ION 
LIBERAL PARTY Mar 1950 
I 
._SEPARATISTS LIBERAL PARTY 
I . 
._ NEW JAPAN LIBERAL PARTY Nov 1953 
I 
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY Apr 1950 
I 
REFORM PARTY Feb 1952 
I 
JAPAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY Nov 1954 
. I 
I 
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY Nov 1955 
I 
Figure 2. Genealogy of Postwar Conservative Parties 
15 
Major Political Parties: 1955-1967 
Four of the five major parties in existence during the period 1955-
1967, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Socialist Party 
(JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), were derived from polit-
ical parties which made new starts immediately after the end of World 
War II (see Figure 2). The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) resurfaced 
after 19 years in hiding and sprang into open activity.lo 
The Liberal Democratic Party 
The Liberal Democratic Party was created in 1955, the result of the 
merger of two conservative parties. These conservative parties which 
emerged in 1945 were essentially resuscitations of the prewar political 
parties which had been dissolved in 1940 at the time of the establishment 
of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. 11 
The conservative merger was prompted, first and foremost by the 
reunification of the JSP. The unified Socialists emerged as the biggest 
single party in the House of Representatives. In addition, the decline 
of the Liberal Party in 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida's inability to cope 
with intraparty strife, and the turmoil in the Diet in 1954 convinced 
the leaders of the business world of the need for political stability 
and effective leadership. The business community came to the conclusion 
that a conservative merger was necessary to meet the emerging Socialist 
h . l' 12 t reat to capita ism. The conservative parties had been fighting among 
themselves and as a consequence were not concentrating on defeating the 
Socialists. Big business had supplied the conservatives with funds, 
most of which had gone to fight other conservatives. Big business wanted 
results for its contributions and pressured for a merger. 
16 
In November 1955, the LDP was formed. The organization of the LDP 
was outlined in the party regulations which were enacted by the party 
itself. There are no government laws prescribing political party organ-
ization. 
In each prefecture, there is a LDP prefectural federation. Each 
federation has a chief secretary, general executive council, policy 
affairs research council, organization committee, and the various other 
party organs which correspond fairly closely to organs in the national 
13 headquarters. National party headquarters are in Tokyo. In the 
organization of the LDP, the party presidency is the most important 
position because since 1955, the president of the LDP has also served as 
the government's chief executive, the prime minister. The LDP has been 
able to control this position as a result of their dominance of both 
houses of the Diet, which are responsible for electing the prime min-
ister. Most importantly they have dominated the lower house. 
The election of the party president is an intense struggle primarily 
because of the factionalism that exists within the party. Factions are 
a predominant feature of Japanese politics and they are very important 
in elections. Factions determine how an individual will vote in the 
·a 1 . 14 party pres1 ency e ection. In return for their votes, the faction mem-
bers receive campaign support in the elections, political funds, and 
assistance in securing posts in the party or in government. 
The LDP is not a mass-based party; its formal membership is actually 
quite small. In 1966, for example, the LDP claimed a registered member-
ship of approximately 1,700,000, but the figure of 350,000 was thought 
15 to be more accurate. The party at the local level functions primarily 
through the koenkai (supporter organizations) of the individual 
17 
politicians. The koenkai are responsible for mobilizing support for 
the LDP. However, it must be understood that the koenkai is an 
organization that supports an individual candidate. Its organization 
belongs to that candidate and not to the party. 
The LDP is a conservative party and its creed reflects this polit-
ical orientation. The creed specifically notes the need for (1) 
establishment of national morals and reform of education, (2) reform of 
the political and bureaucratic apparatus, (3) attainment of economic 
independence, (4) active development of peaceful diplomacy, and (5) 
d . . . 1 . d d 16 a equate preparation to preserve nationa in epen ence. The prime 
emphasis in practical administration has been on promoting economic in-
dependence and spurring rapid economic growth. In the context of 
Japanese tradition, the LDP pursues rather paternalistic policies toward 
the people and the nation. 
The Japan Socialist Party 
The JSP was organized in November 1945, when a number of proletarian 
. d f . 1 d . . l" 17 groups merge to arm a sing e party a vacating socia ism. In 1947, in 
the general election the party gained a plurality of Diet seats and 
formed a coalition cabinet led by socialist Tetsu Katayama. But pres-
sures from the left wing of the Socialist Party led to the downfall of 
the cabinet after eight months. In October 1951, the party split into 
left and right wing parties as a result of conflicting views over the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-United States Security Treaty. 
The left and right wing Socialist parties competed for seats until 
October 1955 when the reunification took place. The party again split 
in 1960; the differences between the two wings seemed to be 
18 
irreconcilable. The party's history has been filled with endless 
left-right confrontations over the direction the party should take. 
The present JSP is the.second largest political party. Formal party 
membership, however, has remained small, about 50,000. But the party 
does manage to garner more than 11,000,000 votes in the lower house 
elections. This support has come primarily through the support of 
Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), the largest labor 
18 
organization in Japan. The support of the Sohyo has been critical for 
the JSP and because of this, critics have given the party the derisive 
19 label of the "Sohyo political department." The party's excessive 
dependence on the Sohyo is one factor hindering its efforts to win a 
majority of the people to its side. 20 
The JSP is a progressive party, advocating a Socialist Party govern-
ment as a transitional government only. A Socialist Party government is 
only a step in the progression to a truly socialist government. JSP 
party policy is anti-LDP and anti-monopoly. It further advocates class 
struggle at home and unarmed neutrality in foreign policy. Internally, 
the party continues to be plagued by factionalism that seems to stimulate 
some very tense internal conflicts. 
The Democratic Socialist Party 
The DSP came into existence in January 1960, the product of a split 
between the left and right wing factions of the JSP. The right wing 
faction members left the JSP, charging that the left wing factions 
dominated the party. The catalyst for the split was the 1960 revision 
of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. 
19 
The DSP defines itself as a "political association of those people 
who believe in the principles of democratic socialism" that will "con-
front capitalism and totalitarianism whether of the right or of the 
left. 1121 The party's platform is basically "anti-LDP and anti-
cornmunist .1122 The DSP is irreconcilably opposed to communism and re-
fuses to consider any plans for a coalition government that includes the 
JCP. 
The DSP is a small party and draws its base of support from the 
Domei (The Japanese Confederation of Labor), the second largest labor 
organization in Japan. The Domei group includes largely private 
industrial unions. Its policies are much more conservative than the 
Sohyo's. 
The Japanese Communist Party 
The JCP was founded in July 1922, as an illegal political party 
which came under the directives of the Third International. During its 
early years, the JCP operated clandestinely. Violent revolution and 
the dictatorship of the proletariat characterized its basic party line. 
In its early years, the JCP was beset with difficulties. The Japanese 
government took repressive measures against the party and as a result, 
the JCP collapsed. 
After World War II, the JCP continued to pursue its line of violent 
revolution, until 1955, when it switched to a policy of peaceful 
revolution. In 1961. at the Eighth Party Congress, the JCP adopted its 
present party platform. The platform calls for the establishment of a 
"democratic coalition" government by creating a unified progressive 
23 
front. The proposed "democratic coalition government" will 
20 
(1) liquidate the Japan-United States Security Treaty, (2) switch from an 
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economic policy tailored to big capital, and (3) establish democracy. 
The JCP is a small party and does not receive any consolidated 
labor union support comparable to that afforded its rivals by the Sohyo 
d h D . 25 an t e omei. The JCP does receive strong support in particular 
unions, especially those on the left wing of the Sohyo group such as 
Nikkyoso (The Japan Teachers' Union). 26 The real secret of the JCP's 
is its organization. Unlike the LDP, the JSP, or the DSP, the JCP is 
a mass-based party. The JCP operates on a variety of fronts, often 
through mass organizations in which its members play leading or, at 
least, prominent roles. One of the less known and most successful of 
th h b th D . Y h 0 . . h M0 0 d 27 ese as een e emocratic out rgan1zat1on, t e insei o. The 
party is also known for its influence in citizens' movements . 
. The Komeito 
The Komeito, also known as the Clean Government Party, was organ-
ized in November 1964. The Komeito was Japan's first religious polit-
ical party and it was formed with the backing of the Soka Gakkai, a lay 
organization affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism. 
The Komeito is a middle-of-the-road reformist party. The party 
platform upholds the ideals of humanistic socialism, an independent 
peaceful diplomacy, adherence to the Constitution, and reinforcement of 
parliamentary democracy. The party since 1970 has advocated a separation 
of politics and religion. 28 However, the base of support for the party 
continues to be the members of the Soka Gakkai. The party has a member-
ship of approximately 400,000, and of these, about 90 per cent are mem-
bers of the Soka Gakkai. The Korneito has tended to appeal to groups that 
21 
feel alienated by the other parties, such as women and people who are 
making the transition from a rural to urban setting. 
Japan's Electoral System 
Japan's general electoral system is based on the Public Offices 
Election Law of 1950. It laid down the provisions for elections of mem-
bers of the Diet and prefectural and local candidates. Candidates for 
office must be 25 years old. To become a candidate for either house of 
the Diet, a person simply notifies the chairman of the local election 
board and files a deposit of 100,000 yen. 29 The money is returned if 
the candidate polls one-fifth of the valid votes cast, divided by the 
number of seats to be filled from the district. 30 Qualifications for 
voting were revised in 1945 to provide for female suffrage and to lower 
the voting age from 25 to 20 years. 
The electoral districts were created by dividing the 46 prefectures 
in such a way that the districts did not cross prefectural lines. Dur-
ing the period 1955-1967, there were 117 electoral districts for the 
lower house of the Diet. Shortly before the 1967 election, the number 
increased to 123. These are medium-sized election districts which were 
established in 1947. Each district has three, four, or five seats, but 
each elector has only one vote. There is one exception, the electoral 
district of the Amami Islands has only one representative. The system is 
basically a multimember, single-vote system. 31 What makes the Japanese 
system unique is the combination of multimember districts and a single 
nontransferrable vote. This combination produces a de facto propor-
tional representation result without being a formal proportional repre-
. 1 . 32 sentation e ection system. 
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In this system, the candiates receiving the highest numbers of 
votes wins. For example, in the Shizuoka Prefecture third district, 
which is entitled to four seats in the House of Representatives, the four 
33 
candidates receiving the highest number of votes win the four seats. 
In this type of system, minority parties which receive only a small 
proportion of the votes cast may win one or more seats. 
There are some problems with such an electoral system. A major 
problem is that members of the same party often compete fot votes in 
the same district. Candidates f.or the House of Representatives often 
run as members of their individual factions rather than as party 
candidates. This may lead to intense, bitter struggles among candidates 
of the same party. These struggles are often more hostile and compet~ 
itive than those with the members of the opposition parties. However, 
this is a major problem only for the candidates of the LDP. 
Because the electoral system provides for multimember districts, 
the political parties must decide how many candidates to run in each 
district. It is necessary for each party to put up the optimum number 
of candidates in: each district because if a party runs too many candi-
dates the votes may be too divided and the party may only win a few or 
it may win none at all. If it runs too few candidates, then valuable 
votes are wasted; votes that could be used to increase the party's 
strength in the Diet. A further complication develops if one of the 
candidates is too popular. Since the voter only has one vote, if too 
many cast their vote for one candidate it may take votes away from 
h f 11 d 'd 34 anot er e ow party can 1 ate. 
Japan's electoral system forces the majority party to calculate 
its chances optimistically and constantly tempts it to run too many 
23 
candidates, thus splitting its strength, while at the same time the 
system encourages the weaker parties to concentrate their smaller support 
more effectively behind one or two candidates. 35 
While anyone who qualifies may become a candidate for office, real-
istically only those who have the endorsement of a p~rty have a good 
chance to be elected. Independents usually have little chance. Those 
candidates who do run as independents are normally those members of 
political parties who did not receive their parties' endorsement. An 
endorsement is important because first of all, it means that the candi-
date is taken seriously in Tokyo, a factor that the politician believes 
carries great weight with the electorate. Secondly, the candiate will 
receive money from the party and can use the services of the party's 
regional organizations, such as they are. Thirdly, the candidate can 
call upon the support of other Dietmen to tour and speak in the district 
on his behalf. 36 
Aside from the strategic party problems of deciding how many candi-
dates to run and the resulting intraparty strife, there are two other 
difficulties inherent in the Japanese electoral system. First, the 
Public Offices Election Law does not contain a workable reapportionment 
provision. The 1947 electoral system has remained basically intact. 
There have been a few changes. The Anami Island was returned in 1953 and 
a new electoral district was created with one seat. In 1964, five new 
electoral districts with 19 legislative seats were created. These 
changes were an attempt to correct inequalities in the electoral system. 
The Japanese system has failed to keep up with large shifts in popula-
tion within Japan, with the result that one common criticism has been 
made concerning the system. That criticism is that the system is biased 
24 
because the rural districts are over-represented. The general ratio of 
representation is 1 to 200,040 but the difference may vary by 70,000. 37 
In the second district of Tochigi, Fujio Masayuki won a seat in the 1967 
general elections with 34,901 votes. In the seventh district of Tokyo, 
however, Nakamura Koichi lost with 96,620 votes. 
The reason for the imbalance in the system is that immediately 
after World War II, the Japanese soldiers returned to their homes in the 
rural areas. The rural system:was established during this period and 
reflects an abnormally large rural population. 38 Although the electoral 
system is to be adjusted every five years on the basis of the national 
census, this has been difficult to do. The result has instead been 
chronic malapportionment. It is easy to add seats to the Diet but not 
to reapportion the existing seats. This means the continued expansion 
of the lower house which is conside.red by many to be too large now. 
Various proposals to change the present "medium-sized" electoral 
districts have been presented. The LDP has advocated a "small-district" 
system, which some believe would work to the party's benefit because it 
might reduce factional strife for nominations and elections. The 
"small-district" system ha·s been rejected not only by the opposition 
parties but also by the antimainstream factions within the LDP. The 
Socialists have advocated the large districts with proportional repre-
sentation. This type of system would probably benefit all opposition 
parties. However, as long as the LDP retains its majority it is not 
likely that there will be a drastic change in the electoral system. The 
LDP benefits from the over-representation of the rural districts because 
a major source of the party's support, it is thought, comes from the 
rural or semi-rural areas. Historically, the LDP has enjoyed 
25 
overwhelming control in these over-represented rural areas. This condi-
tion will be discussed further in Chapters V and VI. The Asahi Shimbun, 
a Japanese newspaper, in its analysis of lower house malapportionment, 
concluded that a fair reapportionment would add 67 seats to the urban 
constituencies and subtract an equal number from the rural areas. 39 
Another difficulty inherent in the electoral system is that the 
system does not exactly reflect the popular vote. Minority parties do 
not get all the legislative seats to which the popular vote entitles 
them. The LDP and the JSP win more seats than their percentages of 
popular vote allows them to receive. The other parties receive fewer 
votes than their popular vote entitles them (see Table I). The reason 
for this disparity is that the Japanese electoral system with its multi-
member districts with a single nontrasf errable vote places a high 
premium on effective campaign strategy. The secret of success lies in 
achieving an optimal relationship between the number of candidates a 
party runs in a given election district and the number of votes that it 
controls in that area, given a fairly equitable distribution of those 
votes among the party's total number of candidates. 40 This situation 
combined with the over-representation of the rural districts accounts 
for most of the disparity. 
The percentage difference between seats received and the popular 
vote has never been great enough to frustrate the people's choice of the 
ruling party in past elections. Generally, the present system seems to 
reflect the will of the people. 41 
Election 
1955 
% of votes received 
% of seats received 
1958 
% of votes received 
% of seats received 
1960 
% of votes received 
% of seats received 
1963 
% of votes received 
% of seats received 
1967 
% of votes received 
% of seats received 
Source: Robert E. Ward, 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND SEATS FOR THE MAJOR JAPANESE 
POLITICAL PARTIES: 1955-1967 
LDP JSP DSP 
63. 2 29.2 
63. 6 33.4 
57.8 32.9 
61. 5 35.5 
57.5 27.5 
63.3 31.0 
54.7 29.0 7.4 
60.6 30.8 4.9 
48.8 27.9 7.4 
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CHAPTER III 
URBANIZATION IN JAPAN 
Introduction 
Before it is possible to determine how urbanization has affected 
political participation and voter preference during the period 1955-1967, 
it is necessary to discuss the urbanization of Japan. Japan just a 
little more than a century ago was an isolated feudal nation. Today, 
Japan is a moder~, wealthy, world power. Japan's achievements have 
attracted the attention of scholars who hope that Japan's rapid modern-
ization may provide a model for other developing nations. 
Modernization, an important concept in the study of comparative 
politics, is ·a complex process whereby "traditional" societies take on 
the characteristics of "modernity." The transformation affects a whole 
range of factors--economic, social, political, and cultural. 1 According 
to Robert E. Ward, a modern society is characterized by low birth, and 
morbidity rates and by high ratios, degrees, or levels of (1) inanimate 
to animate sources of energy; (2) tool technology, mechanization, and 
industrialization; (3) specialization and professionalization of labor; 
(4) gross and per capita national production of goods and services; (5) 
urbanization; (6) differentiation, achievement orientation, and mobility 
in social organization; and (7) literacy, mass education, and mass media 
. 1 . 2 circu ation. 
30 
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In Japan's case, two characteristics of the modernization process 
are difficult to separate. They are economic growth and urbanization. 
Urbanization and economic growth occurred simultaneously. For this 
reason, some mention of Japan's economic growth must be made. 
No country has achieved more spectacular economic progress since 
3 the 1950's as Japan. Japan's economic progress prior to World War II 
had been steady but it was no.t· until after the war that rapid economic 
growth occurred. It seemed remarkable that after a crushing defeat in 
1945, Japan could come back and create one of the largest economies in 
the world. At the time of the surrender in 1945, the nation was faced 
with repairing the enormous damages caused by the war. Roughly 25 per 
cent of the national wealth had been destroyed or lost; some 40 per cent 
of the built-up area of the 66 major cities subjected to air attacks 
had been leveled to the ground; almost 20 per cent of the nation's 
residential housing and almost 25 per cent of all its buildings had 
been obliterated; 30 per cent of its industrial capacity, 80 per cent 
of its shipping and 47 per cent of its thermal power-generating capacity 
had been destroyed; and 46 per cent of its prewar territory had been 
lost, some of it only temporarily, however. 4 
But as with West Germany, Japan's defeat was a prelude to a great 
surge of economic growth. Japan's economic growth has been termed a 
"mh:acle." Although theories concerning the reasons for Japan's 
"miracle" are varied, it is generally accepted that several factors seem 
to have.played an important part. According to J. A. A. Stockwin, these 
factors include a high rate of productive investment by industry, a high 
level of personal savings, low wages, a favorable atmosphere for expan-
sion of exports, an educated and skilled population, a large pool of 
labor, moderate taxation and defense spending, and government policies 
5 which have encouraged economic growth. 
Between 1951 and 1973, the Japanese economy grew at an average 
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annual rate of 10 per cent in real terms, which represented a seven and 
one.::.half fold increase in the size of real GNP. 6 Since the mid-1960's, 
it has ranked third in the world in total GNP, behind the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The GNP has risen from a postwar low of $3.6 
billion (in US dollars) in 1947, to upwards of $488 billion in 1975. 
During the same period, the GNP on a per capita basis rose from $34 dol-
7 
lars to $4,432. 
Japanese Urbanization 
In 1872, the population of Japan was 34,806,000, of which 75 to 80 
per cent were engaged in agriculture. Many of the farmers did not own 
the land they farmed; they were tenants. At the beginning of the Meiji 
Restoration, 65 per cent of the nation income was derived from agricul-
8 ture. In this agrarian society, rice was the primary crop produced. 
In the 1890's~ agriculture's share of the GNP declined to 48.5 per 
cent. But until the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the 
workers were engaged in agriculture. In the p~riod from 1894 (the 
beginning of the Sino-Japanese War) to 1917 (the end of World War II), 
Japan underwent an industrial revolution accomplished by enlarging her 
9 world markets and her range of available resources. This industrializa-
tion was accomplished at the expense of the average Japanese farmer. 
Modernization of rural society was seriously delayed by the lack of 
government measures designed to modernize, and by the limitations of 
1 d d . . 1 . 1 10 natura resources an tra it1ona soc1a patterns. Agricultural 
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production did increase but many farmers were unable to withstand the 
burdens of taxes and the prices of farm equipment and fertilizers. As 
a result, they simply gave up and left the farms for the cities. This 
migration provided industry with a large supply of cheap labor. Much 
of this cheap labor force was composed of women and sons who had no 
prospects of inheriting land. 
Industrialization had a tremendous effect on the structure of 
Japanese society. In this process, rural conununities were drawn out of 
self-sustaining, closed economies into commercial production to support 
larger communities centered in the cities. Urban society, in turn, fed 
back into the rural communities the improved techniques that helped 
11 
expand the productive capacities of the rural lands. With new 
technology, agriculture became capable of supporting increasing numbers 
of people with fewer workers. This created a surplus of labor in the 
rural districts which in turn supplied new labor to the growing corn-
mercial and industrial centers in the cities. 
During this period, in terms of occupation, agriculture and 
forestry decreased in population percentages while industry and commerce 
both experienced gains in population percentages. This increase was not 
totally due to the influx of farmers into the cities. There was an 
overall increase in the total population due to an increased standard 
of living. But the major reason for the increase in population in the 
1 . . h . . f h 1 . d 12 arger cities was t e migration o t e rura resi ents. 
The u.rban population increases were not uniform, as there were 
limitations on the industrial and commercial potential of the different 
cities, depending on geographical access to natural resources and 
markets. That the concentration of industries and commercial organs 
in the cities did account for the movement of large numbers of the 
agricultural population into the cities is undeniable. 13 The cities 
had new jobs to attract the rural populations. Many of the jobs were 
in areas other than industry, such,.as domestic service, manual labor, 
and trade. Cities which served a variety of functions expanded more 
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rapidly and to a greater extent than those which did not. Some examples 
were Tokyo, the capital and center of finance, and Yokohama, which also 
was a key foreign trade center. 
In 1898, there were eight cities with populations of more than 
100,000. By 1920, there were six cities with populations over 500,000 
and 10 cities with a population of more than 100,000. 14 In 1950, there 
were four cities with populations of over 1,000,000 and two were cities 
with a population over 500,000. There were also 58 cities with popula-
tions of over 100,000. The city of Tokyo in 1950, had a population of 
6,277,000. In 1960, there were six cities with populations over 
1,000,000 and three cities with populations over 500,000. There were 
also 107 cities with populations over 100,000. The city of Tokyo, in 
15 
1960, had a population of 9,684,000. 
Between 1868, the Meiji Restoration, and 1965, the population of 
Japan tripled. The population grew from approximately 34,000,000 in 
1872 to 97,000,000 in 1964, making Japan seventh in the world in terms 
f 1 . 16 o popu ation. This population was unevenly distributed among the 
prefecture with 45 per cent of the population living in three metro-
politan areas comprising nine prefectures around Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Nagoya. 
In the period 1868 to 1945, the urban population increase was due 
primarily to the rise of industry, while the growth of the urban 
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population from 1945 to 1947 was due primarily to the rise of the 
tertiary, or service sector (education, administration, information 
services, commerce~ and entertainment), at the expense of the other 
17 
sectors. The rural migration to the cities has continued, especially 
among the young. 
In 1965, 68 per cent of the population lived in urban areas. Of 
these, 48 per cent resided within the Tokaido Megalopolis. The Tokaido 
Megalopolis is a coalescence of Japan's three largest metropolitan areas 
(Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagano) which contain only 19 per cent of the land 
area in Japan. When the first modern census was taken in 1920, only 
18.1 per cent of the population was urban. 
The number of urban households declined from 6,000,000 in 1955 to 
5,400,000 in 1967. Among these 5,400,000 farm households, 4,300,000 
of them were part-time farm households with some members employed in 
industry. During this period, approximately 53 per cent of the gross 
income of farm families was derived from nonagricultural activities (see 
18 
Table II). In 1963, according to the national income by industry, 
primary industries accounted for 13 per cent, secondary industry for 39 
per cent, and tertiary industry for 48 per cent. 19 
The urban areas have been attractive to rural residents for a number 
of reasons. The urban areas offer greater job opportunities and a higher 
standard of living and many rural Japanese leave the farms in order to 
take advantage of such opportunities. The variety of consumer goods and 
services that are available further advance the appeal of the cities. 20 
The government, in order to combat increased migrations, has made it 
a policy to improve the standard of living in rural areas. Agriculture 
has been the most heavily protected of the industries. Domestic price 
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supports for farm products have been the highest in the world. 21 In 
1961, a new agricultural act which called for the restructuring of 
Japanese farming was proposed. Provisions in the act included enlarging 
farms, adjusting output, increasing labor productivity, and most impor-
tautly raising farm incomes. Farm incomes have been raised but the 
other provisions have been overlooked. All of these policies have been 
designed to arrest the rural to urban migration. 
TABLE II 
FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
Year Total Full Time Full-Time 
1950 6,176,000 3,086,000 3,090,000 
1955 6,043,000 2,106,000 3,937,000 
1960 6,057,000 2,078,000 3,979,000 
1963 5,856,000 1,405,000 4,451,000 
1964 5,806,000 1,242 ,_000 4,564,000 
1965 5,665,000 1,219,000 4,446,000 
1967 5,419,000 l,:bSl,000 4,268,000 
Source: Statistical Handbook of JaEan 1970 (Tokyo, 1970). 
Rapid migration, of the type that Japan has experienced, is often 
accompanied by serious social problems and conflicts. 22 Japan, while it 
has experie-qced as high a rate of urbanization after World War II as 
any country, has been fortunate to avoid many of these serious problems. 
For example, Japan is a racially and ethnically homogenous country; it 
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has had no substantial influx of foreigners with different languages, 
customs, and educations. Equally important, the high quality of Japanese 
education outside the cities has meant that migrants have been able to 
cope with city life and compete for city jobs. Above all, the rapid 
postwar economic growth and great employment potential of the cities 
have meant that no significant pool of unemployed and desperate people 
h . h i . 23 ave grown up in t e c ties. However, Japan has not escaped other 
urban problems such as over-crowding. The major cities are saturated 
24 
with people. 
Among the most prominent of the social problems plaguing Japan are 
urban congestion, air and water pollution, inadequate housing, low levels 
of social security, sparse recreation and leisure facilities, weak 
protection against unsafe consumer products, threats to health 
maintenance, and inappropriate educational opportunities. 25 In the rush 
to industrialize, urban planning was pushed aside and private exploita-
tion of the land for production purposes was given precedence. The re-
sult has been that even the Japanese government has said that Japan is 
26 
the most polluted nation in the world. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Robert E. Ward, "Modernization and Democracy in Japan," 
Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, eds., Roy C. Macridis and 
Bernard E. Brown (3rd ed., Homewood, 1968), p. 574. 
2Ibid. 
3 J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy 
(New York, 1975), p. 1. 
4 
Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood 
Cliffs, 1978), p. 19. 
5stockwin, pp. 1-3. 
6Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky, "Japan's Economic Performance: 
An Overview," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., 
Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 3. 
7 
JaEan' s Political 2nd ed., 31. Ward, System, P• 
8 
Takeo Yazaki, Social Change and the City in JaEan (Japan, 1978), 
P· 373. 
9rbid., p. 377. 
lOibid., p. 392. 
11rbid.' p. 418. 
12rbid., P· 420. 
13rbid., p. 390. 
14Ibid., P• 420. 
15Kingsley Davis, World Urbanization 1950-1970 Volume I: Basic 
Data for Cities, Countries, and Regions (Berkeley, 1969), p. 191. 
16statistical Handbook of Japan 1965 (Tokyo, 1965), p. 19. 
17 Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan (Boston, 1972), 
p. 47. 
18statistical Handbook of Japan 1970 (Tokyo, 1970), p. 29. 
38 
39 
19statistical Handbook of Japan 1965, p. 95. 
20 For further information concerning the total populations in each 
of the 46 prefectures during the period 1955-1967, refer to Appendix A, 
Table XVIII. 
21Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its 
Sources," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh 
Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 773. 
22Edwin S. Mills and Katsutoshi Ohta, "Urbanization and Urban 
Problems," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., 
Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 678. 
23Ibid. 
24 
Refer to Appendix B, Table XVIX, for prefectural population 
densities. 
25 1 . fl I So omon B. Levine, Japans Economy: End of the Miracle?" Cur-
rent History (April 1975), p. 150. 
26Ibid., p. 151. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
For the purposes of this study, "political participation" is defined 
as "activity by private citizens designed to influence governmental 
decision making. 111 Political participation takes many forms but because 
of the limitations of this study only the facet of voting behavior will 
be examined. Voting, as an expression of political choice, is of 
particular importance and interest because it is through elections that 
the composition of a democratic government is determined. 
In this study, the question that must be considered is what impact 
does urbanization have on political participation? Much has been written 
about the effects of urbanization on mass political behavior. Unfortu-
nately, there is little consensus on this subject. According to various 
theories, urbanization creates masses of displaced persons who are not 
adequately employed or housed and who are responsive to radicalizing 
movements. However, according to other theories, urbanization is not a 
d . 1. . b·1· . 2 ra ica 1z1ng or mo 1 1z1ng process. The only point of agreement among 
social scientists is that urbanization is a politically relevant var~ 
iable. 
Research has shown that urban residence can alternately be a pas-
itive or negative correlate of political involvement and participation, 
or in some cases it may have no impact at all. 3 Some of the 
40 
41 
contradictions found in this type of research are possibly due to differ-
· ences in levels of analysis and to cultural differences between individ-
ual countries. 
In the late 1950's, Daniel Lerner theorized that urbanization led 
to increased literacy which indirectly was related to political partic-
ipation. 4 The theory that urbanization led to increased political 
participation was generally accepted. Others, including Karl Deutsch, 
stressed the importance of urbanization. According to Deutsch 
urbanization • . • creates among citizens new ties to the 
national scene, increases the amount of political communica-
tion, and leads to greater awareness of social and political 
needs. In short, urbanization is one of the processes of 
modernization which shifts the political orientation of 
citizens from parochial to national and participant. 5 
However, later studies by other researchers came up with conflict-
ing results. Dahl, in 1967, found that the smaller the unit, the greater 
the opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of the 
6 government. In other words, urbanization does not necessarily lead to 
increased participation, in fact it may have the opposite effect. Other 
studies have also shown that in some areas rural residents turn out to 
vote more frequently than urban voters. For example, Herbert Tingsten 
found that in prewar Switzerland rural voter turnout was higher than 
urban voter turnout. In local elections in France, it has been shown 
that rural areas produce a higher voter turnout than other sections of 
7 the country. Japan has also traditionally been associated with higher 
rural turnouts. 8 
Other studies have found that urban voting is more common than 
rural voting. In some studies, urban residence has been associated with 
higher levels of participation such as in the United States. In Sweden 
9 and Norway, similar patterns have been observed. 
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In other studies, researchers have found no relationship between 
urbanization and political participation. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, in 
their reanalysis of the Almond and Verba data for five countries (the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Mexico, and Germany), found 
that "place of residence is no predictor of political activity. 1110 In 
further studies, it was shown that urbanization had little independent 
effect on political participation when the latter is measured by a scale 
. 1 d . b h . 1 d 1 1 f 1. . 1 . . . 11 inc u ing ot nationa an oca acts o po itica participation. 
At the individual level, as opposed to the societal level, there 
are also diverging theories on how urbanization affects political 
participation. There are three common theories concerning the political 
effects of rural to urban migration. The first theory posits that the 
migrant, once in the city, becomes frustrated, bored, and alienated. 
According to this theory, urbanization breeds economic frustration. The 
migrant becomes intensely dissatisfied with the political system when he 
12 realizes that the government could alleviate his problems and does not. 
When the migrant is not integrated into society, he becomes available 
for mobilization by radical parties or organizations. 13 
The second theory is also known as the "supportive migrant" theory. 
According to this theory, the migrant does not feel deprived, rather the 
14 new urbanite is inclined to support the system. The new migrant has 
some foreknowledge of the city and does not have unreal expectations of 
life there. Cityward migration, therefore, does not seem to lead to 
severe socioeconomic frustration, alienation, or radicalization. 
The third theory of the impact of rural to urban migration takes 
the second theory one step further. Initially, migrants are satisfied 
with their urban life which may be an improvement over the old rural 
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life, but the longer they reside in the cities the greater their expecta-
tions. If these expectations are not met, the migrants become dis-
satisfied and susceptible to radicalization. 
Problems exist with each of these theories. But, according to James 
W. White, given the data presently available, the third theory appears 
t 1 h f b . . 15 mos accurate y to represent t e process o ur an1zat1on. 
It can be seen from the preceeding paragraphs that there are numer-
ous discrepancies in<the theories concerning urbanization and political 
participation at both the individual and societal levels. Some of the 
differences can be attributed to differences in levels of analysis. 
Several of the studies have analyzed political participation in individ-
ual countries, while others have analyzed it in several countries as part 
of the modernization process. The type of data utilized may also account 
for some of the variation encountered in these theories. National 
aggregate voting returns and public opinion surveys are two common 
sources of information used in such research. If the underlying differ-
ences in the implications of urban and rural residence in different 
places could be clarified, it could pave the way to identifying basic 
16 
cross-national uniformities in the roots of political performance. 
Theories of Japanese Political 
Participation 
The political implications of urbanization have been of particular 
interest in studies of Japanese politics. Much of the research has been 
concerned with individual Japanese communities. James W. White's study 
of Uji and Robert E. Ward's study of Okayama and Osaka are examples of 
17 this type of study. The other major category of research has utilized 
aggregate national data. Bradley Richardson and Jun'ichi Kyogoku and 
Nobutaka Ike have undertaken such studies. While these studies have 
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each been based on different levels of analysis, there were some general 
points of agreement. The results of these studies can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The voting rate is uniformly higher in rural areas at all levels 
of elections. 
2. At all levels--local, prefectural, and national--the dimensions 
of conservative political strength are greater in the countryside than 
in the city. 
3. Progressive political allegiances in general are notably weaker 
at all levels in the countryside than in the city. 
4. Corrununist Party affiliation is far stronger in the city than in 
the countryside, and is insignificant in the villages at the local and 
18 
prefectural level. 
There are problems with the results of those studies. One problem 
is that some of these studies were limited to a specific community. This 
fact makes generalization of the results to the national level hazardous. 
Another difficulty is that some of these studies were limited to a 
specific year. Some of the studies have attempted to study voting be-
havior over a period of several years but these studies have either been 
concerned with the immediate postwar years in Japan, 1947-1958, or with 
the most recent elections. There has been a gap in the research concern-
ing urbanization and voting behavior during the period 1955-1967. This 
study, it is hoped, may provide some information about voter preference 
during this period. 
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CHAPTER V 
URBANIZATION AND JAPANESE VOTING PREFERENCE: 
1955-1967 
Introduction 
In order to assess the impact of urbanization on Japanese voter 
preferences. the results of five elections for the House of Represent-
atives during the period 1955-1967 were examined. As mentioned pre-
viously, this data is part of the Data Confrontation Seminar~ the Use 
EI_ Ecological Data in Cross-National Research, 1969, and was supplied by 
Michitoshi Takabataki. This data also contains ecological information 
taken from the Japanese national censuses. For the purposes of this 
study, only the data from the 1955, 1960, and 1965 censuses were used. 
A study of urbanization and how it affects voting preferences pre-
sents several difficulties. A fundamental problem is one of definition. 
What exactly does "urbanization" refer to? What constitutes an "urban" 
area? 
In this study, "urbanization" is defined as the process by which, 
through both migration and natural increases, increasing numbers or 
proportions of a society's inhabitants become residents of cities. 1 How-
ever, to define "urban" is more difficult. Unfortunately there is no 
widely accepted definition of "urban." The United Nations, in preparing 
its statistics on rural and urban populations in a given state, uses 
that individual state's criteria of what constitutes a rural area and an 
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urban area. The criteria used to distinguish between rural and urban 
areas varies. 2 Traditionally, rural residence has been associated with 
agricultural employment. More typically, the distinction between "rural" 
and "urban" localities rests on a quantitative criterion of number of 
inhabitants. In many countries, the cutting point between "rural" and 
"urban" localities may lie between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, though 
h . 3 t ere are many exceptions. 
In Japan, the goverrunent uses administrative categories rather than 
4 the size of the population to designate urban and rural areas. The 
administrative categories include a metropolitan prefecture, cities 
(shi), towns (machi), and villages (mura). The categories are somewhat 
misleading because the term "city" often refers to an area which is 
primarily rural in nature. The definitions .are further confused by 
official reports which use the label "large cities" to refer to Tokyo 
and other metropolitan centers. In addition, in the statistics reported 
to the United Nations concerning the number of urban residents, the 
Japanese government defined "urban areas" as "densely inhabited 
districts. 115 
Efforts to clarify these terms have been made. Professor J. A. A. 
Stockwin adapted Okina Yasuhara's system and divided Japan's electoral 
districts into four categories: metropolitan, urban, semi-rural, and 
6 rural. ''Metropolitan" refers to constituencies in the urban category 
which have either no rural population or only a negligible proportion. 
"Urban" refers to constituencies in which, at the time of the past four 
general elections, more than 50 per cent of the electors have lived in 
cities. "Semi-rural" refers to constituencies in which, over the period 
of the last four general elections, the percentage of electors living 
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in cities has increased from less than 50 per cent to more than 50 per 
cent. "Rural" refers to constituencies in which, during the time of the 
past four general elec·tions, less than 50 per cent of the electors have 
1 . d . . . 7 ive in cities. This definition is vague and rather difficult to use. 
It is not a satisfactory definition, at least for the purposes of this 
study; nor are the definitions used by the United Nations or by the 
Japanese government. 
Because of the nature of the data to be examined and the problems 
of definition illustrated in the preceeding paragraphs, an alternative 
definition was decided upon. A further and more precise insight into 
the urban-rural characteristics of the Japanese people may be gained 
from an analysis of their occupational characteristics. 8 A classifica-
tion system based on the percentage of the labor force engaged in 
primary industries (farming, fishing, and forestry) would more accurately 
represent the urban-rural characteristics of the prefectures. The system 
that will be used consists of five categories: Class I = less than 10 
per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, Class II 
10-19 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, Class 
III = 20-29 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, 
Class IV = 30-39 per cent of the population involved in the primary 
sector, and Class V =more than 40 per cent of the population involved 
. h . 9 in t e primary sector. 
This system has been used by Japanese official sources in the 
1 . f 1 1 . lO ana ysis o two genera e ections. A variation of this system has 
11 
been used by Irene B. Taeuber, Jun'ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike. 
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Prefectural Urbanization Levels 
The first step in the analysis of Japanese urbanization was to deter-
mine the level of urbanization for each of the 46 prefectures. The 
ecological information provided in the data set allowed the researcher 
to determine the level of urbanization for each prefecture, during the 
period 1955-1967, using the classification system based on the percentage 
of the population employed in the primary sector. The results are given 
in Table III. 
Looking at Table III, it can be seen that in 1955, 38 of the 46 
prefectures had more than 40 per cent of their labor forces employed in 
the primary sector. These are classified as Class V prefectures. In 
1955, there was one Class IV prefecture, the prefecture of Shizuoka 
with 38 per cent of its population employed in the primary sector. Four 
prefectures had 20-29 per cent of their labor forces employed in the 
primary sector. Only one prefecture, Kanagawa, could be classified as 
a Class IV prefecture. There were two prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, 
that could be classified as Class I prefectures with less than 10 per 
cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector. 
In the years between 1955-1960, the number of Class V prefectures 
declined from 38 in 1955 to 29 in 1960. Ten prefectures had 30-39 per 
cent of their labor force employed in the primary sector and were 
classified as Class IV prefectures. Two prefectures, Hyogo and Fukuoka, 
were Class III prefectures with 20-29 per cent of their labor forces em-
ployed in the primary sector. Kanagawa, Aichi, and Kyoto each had 
between 10-19 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary 
sector and were classified as Class II prefectures. Two Class I 
TABLE III 
LEVELS OF PREFECTURAL URBANIZATION 
1955 1955 1960 1960 1965 1965 
% of Population Degree % of Population Degree % of Population Degree 
Name of in Primary of in Primary of in Primary of 
Prefecture Sector Urbanization Sector Urbanization Sector Urbanization 
1. Hokkaido 43 Class v 36 Class IV 26 Class III 
2. Aomori 62 Class v 52 Class v 47 Class v 
3. Iwate 63 Class v 57 Class v 49 Class v 
4. Miyagi 54 Class v 46 Class v 38 Class IV 
5. Akita 61 Class v 55 Class v 48 Class v 
6. Yamagata 58 Class v 52 Class v 45 Class v 
7. Fukushima 57 Class v 51 Class v 44 Class v 
8. Ibaragi 64 Class v 56 Class v 46 Class v 
9. Tochigi 53 Class v 46 Class v 36 Class IV 
10. Gumm a 51 Class v 43 Class v 34 Class IV 
11. Saitama 46 Class v 35 Class IV 22 Class III 
12. Chiba 56 Class v 47 Class v 33 Class IV 
13. Tokyo 4 Class I 2 Class I 2 Class I 
14. Kanagawa 16 Class II 10 Class II 6 Class I 
15. Niigata 56 Class v 48 Class v 43 Class v ,· 
16. Toyama 46 Class v 39 Class IV 31 Class IV 
17. Ishikama 45 Class v 37 Class IV 29 Class III 
18. Fukui 47 Class v 40 Class v 31 Class IV 
19. ¥amanashi 51 Class v 44 Class v 37 Class IV 
20. Nagano 57 Class v 48 Class v 39 Class IV 
21. Gifu 44 Class v 34 Class IV 26 Class III 
22. Shizuoka 38 Class IV 30 Class IV 23 Class III 
23. Aichi 26 Class III 19 Class II 14 Class II 
24. Mie 48 Class v 42 Class v 33 Class IV 
25. Shiga 51 Class v 44 Class IV 35 Class IV V1 ...... 
TABLE III (Continued) 
1955 1955 1960 1960 
% of Population Degree % of Population Degree 
Name of in Primary of in Primary of 
Prefecture Sector Urbanization Sector Urbanization 
26. Kyoto 23 Class III 18 Class II 
27. Osaka 8 Class I 4 Class I 
28. Hyo go 28 Class III 20 Class III 
29. Nara 42 Class v 31 Class IV 
30. Wakayama 41 Class v 35 Class IV 
31. Tot tori 57 Class v 49 Class v 
32. Shimane 60 Class v 53 Class v 
33. Okayama 51 Class v 43 Class v 
34. Hiroshima 41 Class v 33 Class IV 
35. Yamaguchi 42 Class v 35 Class IV 
36. Tokushima 54 Class v 47 Class v 
37. Kagawa 49 Class v 42 Class v 
38. Ehime 50 Class v 42 Class v 
39. Koc hi 59 Class v 51 Class v 
40. Fukouka 27 Class III 21 Class III 
41. Saga 50 Class v 44 Class v 
42. Nagasaki 48 Class v 41 Class v 
43. Kumamoto 56 Class v 51 Class v 
44. Oita 56 Class v 50 Class v 
45. Miyazaki 59 Class v 53 Class v 
46. Kagoshima 68 Class v 60 Class v 
1965 
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prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, each had less than 5 per cent of their 
labor forces employed in the primary sector. 
In 1965, there were 13 prefectures in the Class V category, 16 
prefectures in the Class IV category, and 9 in the Class III category. 
Four prefectures (Aichi, Kyoto, Hyogo, and Fukuoka) were Class II 
prefectures, with 10-19 per cent of their labor forces employed in the 
primary sector. Three prefectures (Tokyo, Osaka, and Kanagawa) were 
considered to be Class I prefectures, with less than 10 per cent of 
their labor forces employed in the primary sector. 
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In the_ 10 year period between 1955 and 1965 censuses, several 
changes in the urban-rural characteristics of the 46 prefectures can be 
seen. First, there has been a steady, definite decline in the percent-
ages of the labor force employed in the primary sector in all of the 46 
prefectures, except in the prefecture of Tokyo. In the years 1960-1965, 
Tokyo experienced no change in the percentage of persons employed in the 
primary sector. During this period, only approximately 2 per cent of 
Tokyo's labor force was employed in the primary sector. Looking at 
Table III, it can be seen that the range of decline was from -2 per cent 
to -24 per cent. The average rate of decline was 10.26 per cent. How-
ever, even though every prefecture experienced a decline in the primary 
sector, many prefectures remained predominantly rural or semi-rural in 
nature. The prefectures with a high degree of urbanization tend to be 
clustered along what has been referred to previously as the Tokaido 
megapolis which is comprised of the nine prefectures around Tokyo, Osaka, 
and Nagoya. 
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Urban-Rural Voter Preference 
In order to assess the impact of urbanization on voter preference, 
it was first necessary to determine whether there is a difference between 
urban (Class I and II) and rural (Class IV and V) voter behaviQr. Voter 
preference was determined by calculating the percentage of the total vote 
h h . d 12 t at eac group receive . It should be noted that, because of the 
nature of the data, voter preference for each· individual party is not 
given. Rather, the political parties were grouped into the following 
categories by Michitoshi Takabataki: conservative, socialist, communist, 
Buddhist sector, miscellaneous, and independent. The "conservative" 
category includes only the LDP, while the "socialist" category includes 
both the JSP and the DSP. The "communist" category refers to the JCP 
and the "Buddhist sector" refers to the Komeito. 
The results of the five elections held during the period 1955-1967 
for the House of Representatives are given in Tables IV through XVII. 
Detailed information about the changes in levels of urbanization in the 
individual prefectures is ·given in Appendix C. 
Table IV shows the voters' preference in Class V prefecture for 
the year 1955. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in these 
predominantly rural areas the Conservatives have enjoyed overwhelming 
support. In that election year, the support of the Conservatives did not 
fall below 54 per cent. The range of support was wide--54 per cent to 
82 per cent. In 1955, support for the Conservatives averaged 70 per 
cent. 
Table V shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, III, and IV 
prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. 
Looking at the table, it can be seen that in the one Class IV prefecture 
























24. Tot tori 
TABLE IV 
CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1955 HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
54 42 3.0 0.4 
80 17 2.0 
70 28 0.5 0.6 
59 34 0.3 5.0 
66 31 2.0 
73 24 2.0 
66 33 0.2 
70 28 0.3 
68 30 0.7 
68 31 0.4 
64 33 0.5 
76 23 
58 39 2.0 
76 24 
79 20 0.3 
70 29 
58 40 
58 37 4.0 0.5 
73 25 1.0 
77 22 
64 35 
72 24 2.0 
72 27 

















TABLE IV (Continued) 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Name of Prefecture Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
25. Shimane 69 27 3.0 
26. Okayama 66 32 2.0 
27. Hiroshima 74 25 0.4 
28. Yamaguchi 65 33 
29. 'rokushima 79 20 
30. Kagawa 60 23 5.0 
31. Ehime 75 23 0.9 
32. Koc hi 75 23 
33. Saga 73 26 
34. Nagasaki 70 28 0.5 
35. Kumamoto 76 23. 
36. Oita 77 22 
37. Miyazaki 74 24 0.3 
38. Kagoshima 82 16 1.0 
Note: The percentage totals may;.1not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 
























CLASS I, II, III, AND IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1955 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
56 37 5.0 0.9 
55 35 8.0 
53 40 4.0 
69 27 3.0 0.02 
57 35 6.0 0.8 
61 36 1.0 
52 44 2.0 
75 22 2.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and rounding. 













the Conservatives enjoyed overwhelming support--75 per cent. In Class 
III prefectures, the Conservatives also were the voters' choice. The 
range of Conservative support was 57 to 69 per cent. The average rate of 
support was 62 per cent. In the Class II prefecture, the Conservatives 
were also the favorite and received 53 per cent of the total votes cast. 
In the Class I prefectures, the Conservatives received 56 and 55 per cent 
of the total votes cast. 
Table VI shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures for 
the year 1958. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in these 
predominantly rural areas the Conservatives enjoyed overwhelming support. 
In that election year, the support for the Conservatives did not fall 
below 50 per cent. Range of support for the Conservatives was between 
50 and 83 per cent. In 1958, support for the Conservatives in all 38 
Class V prefectures averaged 68 per cent. 
Table VII shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, III, and IV 
prefectures. These classes were combined in Table VII because of their 
small numbers. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in the one 
Class IV prefecture the Conservatives dominated, polling 72 per cent of 
the total vote. In Class III prefectures, the Conservatives also 
succeeded in winning a majority of the total votes cast. The range of 
support varied between 53 and 61 per cent. The average rate of support 
was 58 per cent. In the Class II prefecture of Kanagawa, the Conserv-
atives received 55 per cent of the total vote. In the Class I 
prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka, the Conservatives received 53 and 50 per 
cent of the vote respectively. 
Table VIII shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures for 
the year 1960. Looking at this table, it can be seen that in these 



























CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1958 
HOUSE OF RESPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* 
50 47 2.0 
74 24 2.0 
63 34 1.0 
64 31 1.0 
60 37 2.0 
76 22 1.0 
61 37 1.0 
68 29 1.0 
67 31 1.0 
68 29 1.0 
65 32 2.0 
72 25 2.0 
61 36 2.0 
74 24 2.0 
75 22 2.0 
72 27 0.8 
64 33 1.0 
55 39 4.0 
65 33 2.0 
72 26 0.8 
58 39 2.0 
71 27 1.0 
71 25 2.0 
64 32 2.0 





















TABLE VI (Continued) 
% of % of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous Independent 
Name of Prefecture Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote Vote 
25. Shimane 66 30 3.0 
26. Okayama 64 33 2.0 0.1 
27. Hiroshima 68 30 1.0 
28. Yamaguchi 66 31 2.0 
29. Tokushima 69 29 1.0 
30. Kagawa 73 26 0.4 
31. Ehirne 75 27 0.6 
32. Koc hi 67 31 1.0 
33. Saga 71 3 2.0 
34. Nagasaki 73 25 1.0 0.05 
35. Kurnarnoto 78 21 0.9 
36. Oita 83 30 1.0 
37. Miyazaki 72 27 0.6 
38. Kagoshima 76 22 1.0 0.5 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 
*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1958 election. 














CLASS I, II, III, AND IV PREFECTURES: varER PREFERENCE FOR 
1958 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
52 44 s.o 0.9 
so 49 10.0 
55 40 4.0 
60 37 2.0 0.06 
53 40 6.0 
61 36 2.0 
56 41 2.0 
72 25 3.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 






































CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1960 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* 
72 26 2.0 
62 35 2.0 
59 35 1.0 
57 39 2.0 
71 27 1.0 
61 36 2.0 
66 31 2.0 
67 32 0.8 
64 33 2.0 
71 27 1.0 
54 42 2.0 
66 33 1.0 
63 35 . 1.0 
54 40 5.0 
68 29 1.0 
60 37 2.0 
63 34 2.0 
69 28 2.0 
60 36 2.0 
73 32 1.0 
72 26 1.0 
63 34 1.0 
63 34 2.0 
73 34 2.0 



















TABLE VIII (Continued) 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Name of Prefecture Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
25. Nagasaki 66 32 2.0 
26. Kumamoto 72 25 1.0 
27. Oita 62 35 1.0 
28. Miyazaki 62 35 1. 0 
29. Kagoshima 71 25 1.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 







predominately rural areas the Conservatives again enjoyed overwhelming 
support. In that election year, support f.or the Conservatives did not 
fall below 54 per cent. The range of support for the Conservatives was 
bett.reen 54 and 73 per cent. In 1960, support for the Conservatives in 
all 29 Class V prefectures averaged 65 per cent. 
Table IX shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures. 
Looking at the table, it can be seen that with two exceptions: the 
Conservatives enjoyed a high level of electoral support. In the 
p!'efecture of Hokkaido, the Socialists were very strong in 1960. The 
Conservatives received 50 per cent of the vote, only 3 per cent more 
than the Socialists. The other exception was the prefecture of Ishikawa, 
where the Conservatives polled only 41 per cent of the vote. The Con-
servatives polled more votes than the other parties, but for some 
Teason there was a high percentage of invalid votes. The reason for 
this situation is not indicated in the data. The range of support for 
the Conservatives was between 41 and 70 per cent. The average rate of 
support for the Conservatives was approximately 63 per cent. The average 
rate of support for the Socialists was approximately 30 per cent. 
Table X shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, and III 
prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. 
Looking at the table, it is evident that the Conservatives did not do as 
well in the 1960 election in the Class I prefectures. In the Class I 
prefecture of Tokyo, the Conservatives polled fewer votes than did the 
Socialists. It was admittedly a small margin of victory, approximately 
1 per cent. In the other Class I prefecture, Osaka, the Conservatives 
out-polled the Socialists by only 2 per cent. In the Class II 
prefectures of Kanagawa and Kyoto, the Conservative victories were 













CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1960 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of 





Vote Vote Vote Vote 
50 47 2.0 0.2 
63 34 2.0 
73 25 1.0 
41 19 3.0 
65 33 2.0 
68 29 2.0 
67 31 1.0 
70 22 4.0 
68 30 2.0 
64 34 1.0 0.6 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 
















1. Hyo go 
2. Fukuoka 
TABLE X 
CLASS I, II, AND III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 
1960 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
46 47 5.0 0.4 
45 43 11.0 0.03 
53 41 5.0 
60 37 ·2. 0 0.05 
46 43 9.0 
57 40 2.0 0.08 
50 44 5.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data or to rounding. 











narrower. In Kyoto, the Conservatives won by only 3 per cent. But in 
the Class II prefecture of Aichi, the Conservatives dominated the elec-
tion. In the Class III prefectures, the Conservatives also defeated the 
Socialists. In Fukuoka, however, the margin of victory was only 6 per 
cent. 
Table XI shows the.voters' preferences in Class V prefectures dur-
ing the 1963 election. Looking at the table, it can be seen that the 
Conservatives were again very strong in these predominantly rural areas. 
Support for the Conservatives did not fall below 55 per cent in this 
election. The ra~ge of support for the Conservatives was between 55 and 
79 per cent. In 1963, support for the Conservatives in all 29 Class V 
prefectures averaged 66 per cent. 
Table XII shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures 
during the 1963 election. With two exceptions, the Conservatives 
received over 60 per cent of the vote. Even in the prefectures where 
the Conservatives did not poll over 60 per cent of the vote, the Con-
servatives were still strong enough to poll over 50 per cent of the 
vote. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 51 and 
71 per cent. The average rate of support during the 1963 election was 
approximately 64 per cent. The average rate of support for the Social-
ists during the 1963 election was approximately 32 per cent. Support 
for the Socialists was highest in the prefectures of Hokkaido and 
Yamaguchi where they.polled 45 and 43 per cent of the vote respectively. 
The range of support for the Socialists was between 21 and 45 per cent. 
Table XIII shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, and III 
prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. 
Looking at the table, it isevident that the Conservatives did not do 























23. Koc hi 
24. Saga 
TABLE XI 
CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
67 29 3.0 
62 35 2.0 
55 40 2.0 3.0 
55 41 3.0 
70 27 1.0 
64 34 2.0 
72 25 2.0 
68 30 0.9 
67 30 2.0 
69 28 2.0 0.02 
61 35 2.0 
72 27 1. 0 
66 32 1.0 0.3 
SS 3S 8.0 
77 21 2.0 0.07 
57 39 3.0 
60 37 2.0 
65 31 3.0 
61 36 2.0 
79 19 1.0 
71 27 1.0 
64 33 2.0 
60 29 9.0 











TABLE XI (Continued) 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Name of Prefec·ture Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
25. Nagasaki 60 37 2.0 
26. Kumamoto 75 23 1.0 
27. Oita 70 28 2.0 
28. Miyazaki 62 35 2.0 
29. Kagoshima 73 24 1.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing dci.ta and to rounding. 

















CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
51 45 2.0 
62 34 3.0 
69 27 3.0 
69 21 10.0 
69 28 2.0 
65 32 2.0 
63 34 1.0 
69 26 4.0 
71 26 2.0 
54 43 2.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding. 





















1. Hyo go 
2. Fukuoka 
TABLE XIII 
CLASS I, II, AND III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote* Vote 
45 46 7.0 0.3 
39 46 13.0 0.2 
47 47 5.0 0.01 
55 40 4.0 
40 44 13.0 0.3 
51 44 4.0 
51 41 6.0 
Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding. 










well in the 1963 election. In both Class I prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, 
the Conservatives did not receive a majority of the votes. The Social-
ists outpolled the Conservatives in both Class I prefectures. The 
average rate of support for the Conservatives in Class I prefectures 
in the 1963 election was 42 per cent. The average rate of support for 
the Socialists in Class I prefectures was 46 per cent. In the Class II 
prefectures, the Conservatives outpolled the Socialists in only one 
prefecture, Aichi. In the prefecture of Kyoto, the Socialists outpolled 
the Conservatives by 4 per cent. In the Class II prefecture of Kanagawa, 
the Socialists and the Conservatives each received 46 per cent of the 
vote. In the Class III prefectures, the Conservatives did outpoll the 
Socialists. The average rate of support for the Conservatives was 51 
per cent while the average rate of support for the Socialists was 
approximately 43 per cent. 
Table XIV shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures dur-
ing the 1967 election. In the 14 Class V prefectures, the Conservatives 
were quite strong. In this election, support for the Conservatives did 
not fall below 52 per cent. The range of support for the Conservatives 
was between 52 and 74 per cent. In 1967, support for the Conservatives 
averaged 63 per cent. Support for the Socialists in this selection 
averaged 32 per cent. The range of support for the Socialists was 
between 22 and 43 per cent. 
Table XV shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures dur-
ing the 1967 election. Looking at this table, it is clear that the 
Conservatives enjoyed a clear majority of support with one exception. 
In the prefecture of Nagano, the Conservatives polled 47 per cent of 
the vote, while the Socialists polled 44 per cent of the vote. The 








8. Tot tori 
9. Shimane 






CLASS v PREFECTURES: varER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote 
70 25 3.0 
60 36 2.0 
52 43 3.0 
64 34 2.0 
60 37 2.0 
70 27 2.0 
62 34 3.0 
57 40 2.0 
67 30 2.0 
57 27 9.0 13.0 
67 30 1.0 
67 30 2.0 
59 37 3.0 
74 22 1.0 






Name of Prefecture 
1. Miyagi 
2. Tochigi 















CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote 
60 35 2.0 1.0 
64 34 1.0 
64 32 4.0 
59 30 3.0 8.0 
72 25 2.0 
60 37 2.0 
58 39 1.0 0.4 
47 44 8.0 
68 28 2.0 0.2 
51 44 4.0 
58 31 3.0 7.0 
61 24 2.0 12.0 
73 24 2.0 
71 26 3.0 
69 29 1.0 
62 34 2.0 








range of support for the Conservatives was between 47 and 73 per cent. 
The average rate of support for the Conservatives in this election was 
approximately 62 per cent. 
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Table XVI shows the voters' preferences in Class III prefectures 
during the 1967 election. In the nine Class III prefectures, the Con-
servatives dominated the election with one exception. In the prefecture 
of Hokkaido, the Conservatives and the Socialists each received 47 per 
cent of the vote. The range of support for the Conservatives in Class 
III prefectures was between 47 and 68 per cent of the vote. The average 
rate of support for the Conservatives was 59 per cent. The range of 
support for the Socialists in these prefectures was between 24 and 47 
per cent. The average rate of support for the Socialists was 33 per 
cent. 
Table XVII shows the voters' preferences in Class I and II 
prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. 
Looking at the table, it is evident that the Conservatives no longer 
dominated the Class I prefectures in 1967. In each of the three Class 
I prefectures, the Socialists outpolled the Conservatives. The range 
of support for the Conservatives was between 30 and 37 per cent, while 
the range of support for the Socialists was between 38 and 42 per cent. 
The average rate of support for the Conservatives was 35 per cent, but 
the average rate of support for the Socialists was 40 per cent. In 
three of the four Class II prefectures, the Conservatives outpolled the 
Socialists, although by narrowing margins. In the prefecture of Kyoto, 
the Conservatives and the Socialists each received 39 per cent of the 
vote. The Communists received 44 per cent of the vote in that election. 
The range of support for the Conservatives in 1967 was between 39 and 50 











CLASS III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Communist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote 
47 47 4.0 3.0 
57 30 5.0 7.0 
66 26 5.0 
61 31 2.0 5.0 
62 30 2.0 4.0 
51 43 2.0 
60 34 4.0 
68 24 3.0 4.0 
61 35 2.0 




















Note: The percentage 
TABLE XVII 
CLASS I.AND II PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 
% of % of % of % of % of 
Conservative Socialist Conununist Komei Miscellaneous 
Vote Vote Vote Vote Vote 
37 38 10.0 13 .o 0.1 
37 42 s.o 13 .o 1.0 
30 40 10.0 25.0 
50 39 6.0 0.4 0.03 
39 39 14.0 6.0 
44 41 5.0 10.0 
45 39 7.0 8.0 











per cent. The average rate of support was 45 per cent. The range of 
support for the Socialists in 1967 was between 39 and 41 per cent. The 
average rate of support was 40 per cent. The average rate of support 
for the Communists was 8 per cent. 
Conclusions: Class V Prefectures 
The Conservatives, overall, enjoyed strong support in the 14 pre-
dominantly rural prefectures. While support for the Conservatives 
declined, they never received less than 50 per cent of the total votes 
cast in Class V prefectures. However, the overall trend was a decline 
in support for the Conservatives. The average rate of electoral support 
for the Conservatives in Class V prefectures was approximately 57 per 
cent. The Socialists were not able to pose a serious threat to the 
Conservatives. They enjoyed a steady support of approximately 30 per 
cent. In the Class V prefectures, the Communists have never polled a 
substantial share of the votes cast. Support for the Communists 
averaged about 2 per cent. 
The returns for the Komeito do not allow any conclusions to be 
drawn. The 1967 election was the first in which the Komeito ran 
candidates for the House of Representatives. Returns for the Komeito 
are missing for most Class V prefectures. The most likely explanation 
is that the Komeito did not run candidates in Class V prefectures. 
No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial 
share of the vote in any prefecture. 
Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in the 
Class V prefectures. The reason for this result is that most individuals 
who run as independents are, in reality, members of a major political 
party who did not receive their parties' official endorsement. 
Conclusions: Class IV Prefectures 
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The Conservatives, overall, enjoyed strong support in the semi-
rural prefectures. While their support declined or fluctuated in some 
Class IV prefectures, the Conservatives' average rate of support was 66 
percent. When the prefectures changed from Class V to Class IV, 10 of 
the 16 experienced a decline in Conservative support. This decline in 
support averaged 7 per cent. In the other six prefectures, the Con-
servatives experienced an increase in support averaging about 4 per cent. 
The Socialists were not able to pose a serious threat to the Con-
servatives. In Class IV prefectures, the Socialists enjoyed an average 
rate of support of. approximately 27 per cent. When the prefectures 
changed from Class V to Class IV, there was no clear indication of a 
trend of either increasing or decreasing support. Socialists in seven 
of the prefectures experienced a decline in support averaging about 4 
per cent. In nine of the prefectures, the Socialists experienced an 
increase in support averaging approximately 5 per cent. 
In the Class IV prefectures, the Communists have never polled a 
substantial share of the votes cast in any election during the period 
1955-1967. The average rate of electoral support was less than 2 per 
cent. When the prefectures changed classes, the Connnunists in nine of 
these prefectures experienced an increase in support of approximately 
1 per cent. In one of the prefectures, the Connnunists experienced a 
decline in support of 1 per cent. 
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The Komeito first ran candidates for the House of Representatives 
in 1967. They ran candidates in three of the Class IV prefectures. The 
party received approximately. 9 per cent of the votes cast in these 
prefectures. 
No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial share 
of the vote in any prefecture except that of Miyagi. In Miyagi, 
miscellaneous candidates and parties were unusually successful. With-
out adequate documentation, it is impossible to explain this anomaly. 
Independents never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Class 
IV prefectures. The reason for this result is that most individuals who 
ran as independents are, in reality, members of major political parties 
who did not receive their parties' official endorsement. 
Conclusions: Class III Prefectures 
The Conservatives dominated the Class III prefectures. While sup-
port for the Conservatives, in these traditional prefectures, fluctuated 
or declined, it averaged 64 per cent. When the prefectures changed to 
Class IV, Conservatives in five of the nine prefectures experienced a 
decline, averaging 9 per cent. When the prefectures changed to Class 
III, Conservatives in eight of the nine prefectures experienced a decline 
in support of approximately 6 per cent. Only one prefecture showed an 
increase in Conservative support when the prefecture changed classes. 
The Socialists, in Class III prefectures, were stronger than in 
Class IV and V prefectures. In two of the prefectures, support for the 
Socialists declined when the prefectures changed to Class IV. The 
average rate of decline was 3 per cent. Three prefectures experienced 
no change in support when they changed to Class IV. Three of the 
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prefectures experienced an increase in Socialist support when they 
changed classes. When the prefectures chaµged to Class III, Socialists 
in four of the prefectures experienced a decline in support averaging 
approximately 4 per cent. In five of the prefectures, the Socialists 
experienced an increase in support averaging approximately 5 per cent. 
In Class III prefectures, the Communists were never able to poll 
a substantial share of the votes cast. The average rate of electoral 
support was approximately 2.5 per cent. Of the eight prefectures that 
went from Class V to IV to III, three of them experienced a decline when 
the prefecture went to Class IV. The average rate of decline was 2 per 
cent. Three of these prefectures experienced no change in Communist 
support. One prefecture experienced an increase of 1 per cent. 
The Komeito ran candidates in five of the nine prefectures. The 
average rate of support was approximately 5 per cent. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties have not been a significant 
force in Class III prefectures. The average rate of support for the 
miscellaneous candidates and parties was approximately 0.5 per cent. 
Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in 
Class III prefectures. The reason for this is that most individuals 
who run as Independents are, in reality, members of a major political 
party who did not receive their parties' official endorsement. 
Conclusions: Class II Prefectures 
In Class II prefectures, the Conservatives experienced an overall 
decline in support. Support in the Class II prefectures was not as 
strong as in Class III, IV, and V prefectures. The average rate of 
support was approximately 53 per cent. However, support did fall as 
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low as 39 per cent in the prefecture of Kyoto. When the prefectures 
changed to Class II, three of the prefectures experienced a decline of 
approximately 7 per cent. One prefecture experienced no change in sup-
port. 
The Socialists in Class II prefectures were strong. Support in 
Class II prefectures has been as high as 44 per cent. Support for the 
Socialists in Class II prefectures averaged 40 per cent. When the 
prefectures shifted to Class II, two of the prefectures experienced a 
decline in Socialist support of approximately 3 per cent. One prefecture 
experienced no change in suppo~t. 
The Communists were more successful in Class II prefectures than 
In Class III, IV, or V prefectures. Support for the Communists was as 
high as 14 per cent. When the prefectures changed classes, three of the 
four prefectures experienced an increase in support for the Communists. 
The average rate of increase was approximately 2 per cent. One 
prefecture experienced no change in support~ 
The Komeito ran candidates in all four Class II prefectures. The 
average rate of support for the Komeito was approximately 7 per cent. 
No miscellaneous candidates or parties recieved a substantial share 
of the votes in any Class II prefecture. The average rate of support was 
less than 1 per cent. 
Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in 
Class II prefectures. 
Conclusions: Class I Prefectures 
In the Class I prefectures, the Conservatives have not been the 
dominant force. Initially, the Conservatives were successful, but after 
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the 1960 election the Socialists effectively challenged their control. 
Support in these metropolitan prefectures was as low as 30 per cent. 
'When Kanagawa became a Class I prefecture, support for the Conservatives 
declined 5 per cent. The average rate of support for the Conservatives 
in Class II prefectures was approximately 47 per cent. 
The Socialists were a major force in Class I prefectural politics. 
The average rate of support for the Socialists was 40 per cent. When the 
prefecture of Kanagawa changed to a Class I prefecture, support for the 
Socialists dropped 5 per cent. 
The Communists were strongest in the Class I prefectures. The 
average rate of support for the Communists was approximately 7 per cent. 
This rate of support was higher than that, in any other class. 
The Komeito ran candidates in each of the three Class I prefectures. 
The Komeito polled a substantial share of the votes cast in each Class I 
prefecture. Support for the Komeito ranged from 25 to 13 per cent and 
it averaged 17 per cent. 
No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial share 
of the votes in any Class I prefecture. 
Independents were not a strong force in Class I prefectural 
politics. With one exception, Independents never received more than 
1 per cent of the votes cast in any House of Representatives election. 
1955-1967 Results and Trends 
While the literature concerning Japanese political behavior has 
stated and assumes that there is a difference between urban and rural 
voting preference. that difference is not as distinctive as one might 
have expected. In the 1955 and 1968 House of Representatives elections, 
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both urban and rural voters preferred the Conservatives. In the 1960 
election, the voters in Class II, III, IV, and V prefectures expressed a 
·similar preference for the Conservatives. But, in the Class I 
prefectures, voter preference was different. 
In the 1963 election, the Conservatives dominated the Class III, IV, 
and V prefectures while voters in the Class I and II prefectures ex-
pressed preferences for other parties. In the 1967 election, in the 
Class II, III, IV, and V prefectures, voters expressed similar prefer-
ences while those in Class I prefectures tended to support another party. 
In the 1967 election, the Komeito ran candidates for the time in the 
elections for the House of Representatives. Their showing was quite 
remarkable, but the lack of data makes it impossible to evaluate the 
party's impact. 
There were differences in urban and rural voting preferences. but 
they did not occur to the extent that was anticipated. It was only in 
the 1963 and 1967 elections that, in the metropolitan prefectures (Class 
I), a distinct difference in voter preference became evident. The data 
does seem to support a hypothesis that distinguishes between metropolitan 
voters' preferences and rural and semi-rural voters' preferences. The 
data does not, at this time, allow any definite distinctions to be made 
between urban and traditional voters' preferences and metropolitan, 
rural, or semi-rural voters' preferences. 
Since voters will tend to be attracted to the party which is most 
willing and capable of meeting their demands, it was thought that 
Japanese rural and urban voters would tend to support the conservative 
parties which have traditionally advocated politics which appeal to 
rural interests. Urban voters, it was thought, would tend to support 
the more progressive parties which have been more responsive to their 
needs. It was expected that voters in predominantly urban prefectures 
(Class I and II) would have indicated a preference for progressive 
parties such as the Socialists or the Communists. 
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According to the results of this study, it is true that in Class I 
prefectures voters preferred the Socialists in the 1963 and 1967 elec-
tions. In 1960, Class I prefecture supported the Socialists, while the 
others supported the Conservatives. The Communists were also stronger 
in the Class I prefectures than in the rural prefectures. 
Voters in Class IV and V prefectures, as expected, indicated a 
preference for the Conservatives. In each election held for the House 
of Representatives during the period 1955-1967, the Conservatives were 
the overwhelming favorites in the Class IV and V prefectures. The 
Socialists and the Communists, on the whole, were not strong in these 
rural and semi-rural prefectures. 
As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture changed, it was 
expected that there would be a corresponding shift in voter preference. 
Increasing levels of urbanization should result in additional support 
for the more progressive parties. It is important to observe the 
changes that occurred in the prefectures that shifted classes. The 
prefectural changes that are of particular importance are the changes 
from Class IV to III and Class III to II. These are distinct changes in 
prefectural levels of urbanization and a noticeable change in voter 
preference should be evident. This assumption is not borne out by the 
data. When the prefectures shif;ted from Class IV to III, the Conserv-
atives continued to dominate the elections. Several prefectures expe-
rienced a decline in Conservative support, which would be expected. 
The Socialists, in a majority of the prefectures that changed to Class 
III, experienced an increase in support. However, even in those 
prefectures, the Conservatives continued to be very strong. 
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When the prefectures changed to Class II, a majority of these 
prefectures experienced a decline in support for the Conservatives. In 
one half of the Class II prefectures, the Socialists also experienced a 
decline in support. There is no clear evidence to show that a change in 
t:he urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture would result in a shift 
in voter preference. It would be expected that as the prefectures 
shifted classes, the Socialists would have received increasing support. 
That did occur in a few prefectures, but it did not occur to the extent 
expected and there was no definite, perceivable trend. The data does not 
seem to support the assumption. 
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The primary purpose of this study was to assess the impact of 
urbanization on Japanese voter preferences. In the following paragraphs, 
some of the findings reported in the previous chapters are reviewed and 
an attempt will be made to identify any patterns of preference. 
The political preferences of urban and rural residents, during the 
period 1955-1967, were examined to determine whether differences in 
voter preference existed. An examination of the data indicates that 
during this period there were differences between urban and rural voter 
preferences. However, as seen in Chapter V, there is no conclusive 
pattern of preference. 
During this period, urban and rural voters tended to express 
similar preferences for the Conservatives. It was initially expected 
that the rural and semi-rural voters would prefer the Conservatives 
because the party has had a history of advocating policies specifically 
aimed at the rural interests. 1 This expectation was proven to be correct 
in the results given in Chapter V. In the five House of Representative 
elections considered, the Conservatives in the rural and semi-rural 
prefectures were the overwhelming favorites. 
Further, it was expected that the urban and metropolitan voters 
would have expressed preferences for the more progressive parties. This 
was true for some of the prefectures. In the metropolitan prefectures, 
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for example, the voters preferred the Socialists in the 1963 and 1967 
elections. However, a majority of the voters in the urban and transi-
tional prefectures preferred the Conservatives. It should be noted 
that the Communists were stronger in the metropolitan prefectures than 
in the rural prefectures. 
As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture changed, it was • 
thought that there would be a corresponding change in voter preference. 
Preference was expected to shift from the Conservatives, the LDP, to the 
more progressive parties such as the JSP, DSP, or the JCP. As the data 
in Chapter V indicates, there was no overall distinguishable shift in 
voter preference. In some prefectures, this shift did occur but not to 
the extent expected. 
It is interesting to note that other studies have shown that there 
are significant differences between urban and rural residents' political 
behavior. 2 For example, rural voters tend to be more interested in 
politics and have a stronger sense of political effectiveness. However, 
these differences may not affect actual voting preferences. 
An understanding of the Japanese political culture may help to ex-
plain or clarify this situation. "Individualism," a belief which 
stresses the importance and superiority of the individual, is an integral 
part of Western political thought. In Japan, "individualism" has never 
been fully adopted. uindividualism" has had negative connotations in 
3 Japan. It is associated with such traits as nihilism, selfish egotism, 
and antisocial behavior. Most Japanese prefer to be a member of a group 
and act within that group even though group membership usually implies 
some suppression of individual desires and wishes in favor of group 
4 norms and goals. In Japan, most citizens feel more comfortable acting 
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in consensus with a group--either their family, peers, or co-workers. 
Therefore, when the actual votes are cast, a citizen (whether a rural or 
urban resident) may feel an obligation to vote inaccordance with his 
perceived group's wishes. So that even an urban voter who was less 
interested in politics and felt less politically effective than his 
rural counterpart, could (through his group memberships) express similar 
party preferences. 
Opinion polls have shown that while many citizens are critical of 
the conservative LDP government and may feel that another political 
party or coalition of parties would provide more effective leadership, 
they still want the LDP to remain in control of the government. 5 The 
pressures of group memberships may help explain this feeling of 
ambiguity toward the political parties and the political system. It may 
also help explain the persistence of conservative strength and provide 
some insight into a situation where urban/rural differences in political 
behavior diminish the actual act of voting occurs. 
Of course, this study has not dealt with any aspect of political 
behavior other than that of voting. For that reason, speculation is 
necessarily limited. There are; however, some possible explanations for 
the results encountered. 
One reason for the weakness of the progressive parties during 
1955-1967 was, obviously enough, the strength of the Conservatives. 
Although there were five major political parties active during these 
years, the Japanese political system was commonly referred to as a "one 
6 
and a half party system." The LDP was in control of the apparatus of 
government and was able to use its position to help it dominate Japanese 
politic·s. The LDP could provide tangible services and a strong sense 
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of identity with an active, effective party. The progressive parties 
were portrayed by the LDP, the press, and by scholars as reactionary and 
ineffectual. This may have affected voters 1 perceptions of progressive 
parties as a viable, effective alternative to the LDP . 
. Another possible explanation for the failure of the progressive 
parties to attract votes is that groups that the JSP and the JCP rely 
on for support, especially the union members, have found that the LDP 
has adequately represented their interests. Rising affluence has pro-
moted political moderation among workers. Studies of workers in Japan's 
auto industry, for example, have shown that they moderated their 
political allegiances significantly in step with their growing afflu-
7 ence. As Gary D. Allinson pointed out, a fundamental problem confront-
ing Japan's progressive parties was: "How could a party premised on 
inequity survive when the policies of an established regime were reduc-
ing inequity for the party's key constituents? 118 
A further explanation is that the members of the various parties 
overlap in terms of political preferences. 9 In other words, each of 
the political parties contains members which hold views closer to those 
of another political party. In a study carried out in Tokyo in 1964, 
the conclusion ~as that among LDP supporters, some 30 per cent had 
progressive views, while 28 per cent of those who supported progressive 
parties were conservative in their ideas. 8 In terms of conservative 
and progressive party membership, there is an overlap of membership. 
The individuals who fall in this category may cross over and vote for 
the other party's candidates. 
Political socialization may also help explain why place of residence 
is not an accurate predictor of political party preference as was 
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theorized in Chapter I. Most voters,.during the years 1955-1967, were 
products of a prewar Japanese society. Educated in the prewar school 
system, aligned with conservative politicians, and accustomed to the 
relatively consensual· politics of the 1920's and 1960's, they were very 
l .k 1 . 10 i e y to support conservatives. It was not until the 1960's that the 
postwar changes in Japan's educational system affected politics. The 
educational system produced new attitudes in the future voters who 
tended to support the Socialists. It was in the 1960, 1963, and 1967 
elections that the potential strength of the Socialists became evident 
in the metropolitan areas. 
Although the results of this study showed no definite pattern of 
preference, the importance of urbanization as an independent variable 
should not be dismissed without further study. As pointed out pre-
viouslv, other researchers have found that urbanization does signif-
icantly affect other aspects of political behavior such as voter turnout, 
level of interest in politics, and feelings of political efficacy. Voter 
preference, too, may be found to be significantly affected by urbaniza-
tion. It may be that place of residence and preference for a particular 
political party may not be a direct relationship. Place of residence, 
as an independent variable, may not be able to account for differences 
in voter preferences. It is likely that an individual's party prefer-
ences are the result of an interaction of a number of variables such as 
education, occupation, and social class. Further research could serve 
to explain some of the results found in this study. 
This study was quite limited in its scope. The analysis was con-
cerned only with the years 1955-1967 and only with prefectural voting 
returns. And, because of the nature of the data, this study could only 
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be concerned with aggregate Japanese voting preferences. The data does 
not allow for conclusions to be drawn concerning individual Japanese 
voter preferences. The conclusions formed may not be valid for indi-
vidual voter preferences, or for voter preference at the local level. 
Future studies concerning Japanese voter preference may help 
clarify the role of urbanization in voting behavior. The importance of 
urbanization should not be dismissed. It is a complex process but the 
increasing levels of urbanization in Japan make it necessary for re-
searchers to understand what impact such a phenomenon has on the 
political system. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 See Chapter III, p. 36. For further information see Edward F. 
Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," Asia's 
New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh Patrick and Henry 
Rosovosky (Washington, 1976). 
2see Bradley M. Richardson, "Political Attitudes and Voting 
Behavior in Contemporary Japan: Rural and Urban Differences" (unpub. 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1966). Also, 
see Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 
1978). 
3 Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics: Patron-Client Democracy (New 
York, 1972). p. 10. 
4Ibid. 
5see T. J. Pemple's, "The Dilemma of Parliamentary Opposition in 
Japan," Polity (Fall 1975), pp. 63-79, for a discussion of the problems 
facing opposition parties. 
61bid, p. 63. 
7 Gary D. Allinson, Suburban Tokyo (Berkeley, 1979), p. 226. 
8Ibid., p. 227. 
9 Ike, p. 97. 
lOAllinson, p. 144. 
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TOTAL PREFECTURAL POPULATIONS: 1955-1967 
Total Total Total Overall 
Population Population Population Population 
Name of Prefecture 1955 1960 1965 Change 
1. Hokkaido 4,773,087 5,039,206 5,171,800 Increase 
2. Aomori 1, 382, 523 1,426,606 1,416,518 Increase 
3. Iwate 1,427,097 1, 448, 517 1,411,118 Decrease 
4. Miyagi 1, 727 ,065 1,743,195 1, 753,12 6 Increase 
5. Akita 1,348,871 1,335,580 1,279,835 Decrease 
6. Yamagata 1,353,649 1,320,664 1, 263'103 Decrease 
7. Fukushima 2,095,237 2,051,137 l, 983, 7 54 Decrease 
8. Ibaragi 2,064,037 2,047,024 2,056,154 Decrease 
9. Tochigi 1, 547' 580 1,513,624 1, 521, 656 Decrease 
10. Gumma 1,613,549 1,578,476 1,605,584 Decrease 
11. Saitama 2, 262' 623 2,430,871 3,014,983 Increase 
12. Chiba 2,205,060 2,306,010 2,701,770 Increase 
13. Tokyo 8,037,084 9,683,802 10,869,244 Increase 
14. Kanagawa 2,919,497 3,443,176 4,430,743 Increase 
15. Niigata ·2' 473,492 2,442,037 2,398,931 Decrease 
16. Toyama 1,021,121 1,032,614 1,025,463 Increase 
17. Ishikawa 996,187 973,418 980,499 Increase 
18. Fukui 7 54 ,055 7 52, 696 7 50, 557 Decrease 
19. Yamanashi 807,044 782,062 763,194 Decrease 
20. Nagano 2,021,292 1,981,433 1,958,007 Decrease 
21. Gifu 1., 583, 605 1,638,399 1,700,365 Increase 
22. Shizuoka 2,650,435 2,756,271 2, 912, 521 Increase 
23. Aichi 3,769,209 4,206,313 4,798,653 Increase 
24. Mie 1, 485, 582 1,485,054 1, 514,467 Increase 
25. Shiga 853,734 842' 695 853 ,385 Decrease 
26. Kyoto 1,935,161 1,993,403 2,102,808 Increase 
27. Osaka 4' 618,308 5, 504, 746 6,657,189 Increase 
28. Hyo go 3,620,947 3,906,487 4,309,944 Increase 
29. Nara 776,861 781,058 825 '9 65 Increase 
30. Wakayama 1,006,819 1,002,191 1,026,975 Increase 
31. Tot tori 641, 259 599' 135 579,853 Decrease 
32. Shimane 929,066 888,886 821, 620 Decrease 
33. Okayama 1,689,800 1,670,454 1,645,135 Decrease 
34. Hiroshima 2,149,044 2,184,043 2,281,146 Increase 
35. Yamaguchi 1,609,839 1,602,207 1,543,573 Decrease 
36. Tokushima 878,109 847,274 815,115 Decrease 
37. Kagawa 943,823 918 ,867 900,845 Decrease 
38. ·Ehime 1,540,628 1, 500,687 1,446,384 Decrease 
39. Koc hi 882' 683 854, 595 812,714 Decrease 
40. Fukuoka 3,859,764 4,006,679 3,964,611 Decrease 
41. Saga 973,749 942,874 871,885 Decrease 
42. Nagasaki 1, 74 7, 59 6 1, 760,421 ·1,641,245 Decrease 
43. Kumamoto 1,895, 663 1, 856,192 1,770,736 Decrease 
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TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Total Total Total Overall 
Population Population Population Population 
Name of Prefecture 1955 1960 1965 Change 
44. Oita 1~277 ,199 1,239,655 1,187,480 Decrease 
45. Miyazaki 1~139,384 1,134,590 1,080,692 Decrease 
46. Kagoshima 2,044,112 1,963,104 1,853' 541 Decrease 
APPENDIX B 




PREFECTURAL POPULATION DENSITIES 
Population/krn2 Population/krn2 Population/krn2* 
Name of Prefecture 1955 1960 1965 
1. Hokkaido 60. 8 64 .2 66.0 
2. Aomori 143.8 148.4 147.0 
3. Iwate 93.4 94.8 92.0 
4. Miyagi 237.0 239.3 241.0 
5. Akita 116.2 115.0 110.0 
6. Yamagata 145.2 141.6 135.0 
7. Fukushima 152.1 148.9 144.0 
8. Ibaragi ' 338. 9 336. 2 338.0 
9. Toshigi 240.4 235. 8 237.0 
10. Gumma 254.8 248.6 253.0 
11. Saitama 595.0 639. 7 793.0 
12. Chiba 438.0 489.0 535.0 
13. Tokyo 3,972.8 4,777.7 5 '3 57. 0 
14. Kanagawa 1,236.4 1,458.1 1,886.0 
15. Niigata 196. 7 194.2 191.0 
16. Toyama 240.1 242.9 241.0 
17. Ishikawa 230.4 232.1 234.0 
18. Fukui 176.8 179.8 179.0 
19. Yamanashi ' 180. 8 175.2 ' 171.0 
20. Nagano 148.4 145.9 144.0 
21. Gifu 151.1 155. 7 160.0 
22. Shizuoka 341.2 354.8 37 5.0 
23. Aichi 745.3 831. 7 948.0 
24. Mie 257.7 257. 6 263.0 
25. Shiga 212.6 209.8 212.0 
26. Kyoto . 417. 6 432.2 456.0 
27. Osaka 2, 551. 7 3,005.6 3,618.0 
28. Ryogo 434.7 469.0 517.0 
29. Nara 210.4 211. 5 224.0 
30. Wakayama 213. 5 212.6 218.0 
31. Tot tori 176.1 171.8 166.0 
32. Shimane 140.2 134.2 124.0 
33. Okayama 239.4 236.6 233.0 
34. Hiroshima 254.9 259.0 270.0 
35. Yamaguchi 265 .1 263.8 254.0 
36. Tokushima 212.0 204.5 197.0 
37. Kagawa 507.6 494.2 484.0 
38. Ehime 272. 6 265.6 256.0 
·39. Ko chi 124.2 120.3 114.0 
40. Fukuoka 787.6 817.6 807.0 
41. Saga 405.1 392.3 362.0 
42. Nagasaki 427.7 430.8 401.0 
43. Kumamoto 257. 2 251.8 240.0 
Name of Prefecture 
44. Oita 
45. Miyazaki 
46 .. Kagoshima 



















INDIVIDUAL PREFECTURAL TRENDS 
107 
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The following paragraphs provide information concerning individual 
prefectural voting trends for the years 1955-1967. The prefectures are 
grouped according to their level of urbanization in 1967. The purpose 
of the following is to allow the reader to look at the voting preferences 
within the individual prefectures with greater ease. 
Class V Prefectures 
These are prefectures that have remained Class V prefectures during 
the period 1955~1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that 
occurred in support for each party during the period. 
Aomori 
In the prefecture of Aomori, there was an overall decline in support 
for the Conservatives. However, in each election year support for the 
Conservatives has not been below 67 per cent. 
During this period, the Socialists experienced small gains in sup-
port. Support for the Socialists has ranged from 17 to 29 per cent. 
The Communists have not been a strong force in Aomori during 1955-
1967. Support for the Communists was not above 3 per cent. 
In 1967, the percentage of electoral support for the Korneito was 
not given. The reason for this is probably that the Komeito did not run 
a candidate in Aomori. This was the first House of Representatives 
election that they competed in and their resources were limited so the 
party carefully selected prefectures in which they would have the best 
chance of winning. 
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Iwate 
In the prefecture of Iwate, there was a steady decline in support 
for the Conservatives. But, in each election during the period 1955-
1967 support for the Conservatives was 60 per cent or above. 
During this period, there was a steady increase in support for the 
Socialists. Support for the Socialists ranged between 17 and 36 per 
cent. 
Support for the CoIDIDunists in Iwate was not strong during this 
period. Support for the Communists was never above 2 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in the prefecture of 
Iwate in 1967. 
In 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties received 0.6 per cent 
of the votes cast. 
Akita 
In the prefecture of Akita, there was a steady decline in support 
for the Conservatives. However, support for the Conservatives during 
the period 1955-1967 did not fall below 50 per cent. 
There was, during this period, increasing support for the Social-
ists. Support for the party reached its peak in 1967 when the Social-
ists polled 43 per cent of the vote. 
The Connnunists enjoyed steady, low support during this period. 
Support for the Communists was never greater than 3 per cent. 
In 1967, the percentage of electoral support for the Komeito was not 




In the prefecture of Yamagata, during the period 1955-1967, there 
was an overall declQne in support for the Conservatives. There was one 
exception, in 1958 the Conservatives experienced a gain of 3 per cent. 
The Socialists experienced a steady increase in support during this 
period. There was one exception; in 1958 the Socialists suffered a 
decline of 2 per cent. Support for the Socialists was as high as 34 per 
cent in 1967. 
Support for the Communists in this prefecture was consistently low. 
Electoral support was never greater than 2 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamagata in the 
1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Yamagata. 
But in 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties polled 2 per cent of 
the vote. 
Independents also were not strong in Yamagata. Support for Inde-
pendents was never greater than 1 per cent. 
Fukushima 
In the prefecture of Fukushima, during the period 1955-1967, there 
was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. However, support for the 
Conservatives did not fall below 60 per cent. 
There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this 
period. Support for the Socialists ranged between 33 and 37 per cent. 
Support for the Communists in the prefecture of Fukushima was low 
but steady. Support was never greater than 5 per cent. 
The Komecito probably did not run a candidate in Fukushima in the 
1967 election. 
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Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Fukushima. 
In 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties polled 0.2 per cent of the 
vote. 
Ibaragi 
In the prefecture of Ibaragi, during the period 1955-1967, there was 
fluctuating sup_port for the Conservatives. However, the Conservatives 
have always polled more than 66 per cent of the vote during this period. 
There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this 
period. There was an overall increase in support for the Socialists. 
Support for the Socialists varied between 28 and 34 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was consistently low. It has never been 
greater than 1 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ibaragi in the 1967 
election. 
Independent candidates were never stro~g in Ibaragi. Independents, 
during 1955-1967, never polled more than 0.5 per cent. 
Niigata 
In the prefecture of Niigata, during the period 1955-1967, there 
was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. But, the Conservatives 
never received less than 54 per cent of the vote during this period. 
There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this 
period. There was, however, a small overall decline in support for the 
Socialists. 
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The Communists have enjoyed low.steady support in the prefecture of 
Niigata. Support was never greater than 3 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Niigata in the 1967 
election. 
Independents have never been strong.in Niigata. They have never 
polled more than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Tot tori 
In the prefecture of Tottori, during the period 1955-1967, there was 
uneven support for the Conservatives. There was a steady decline in sup-
port for the Conservatives after the 1958 election. But, electoral 
support never dropped below 57 per cent. 
During this period, there was a drop in the electoral support for 
the Socialists after 1955. After the 1958 election, there were small 
gains in support. The range of support for the Socialists was between 
32 and 40 per cent. 
The Communists enjoyed low steady support in the prefecture of 
Tottori. Support for the Communists was never greater than 4 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Tottori in the 
1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Tottori 
during this period. In 1960, miscellaneous parties and candidates 
received less than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also were not strong in Tottori. During this period, 
Independents polled less than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
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Shimane 
In the prefecture of Shimane during 1955-1967, there was fluctuating 
support for the Conservatives. Support fluctuated between 65 and 69 per 
cent. However, support never fell below 65 per cent. 
The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support. Support 
fluctuated between 27 and 31 per cent. The Socialists never received 
more than 31 per cent of the votes cast in any one election. 
Support for the Communists was low but steady. Support for the 
Communists was never greater than 3 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Shimane in the 1967 
election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Shimane 
during this period. In 1960, miscellaneous parties and candidates 
received 0. 6 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also were not strong in Shimane. Independent 
candidates never polled more than 0.6 per cent of the votes cast. 
Ko chi 
In the prefecture of Kochi, during the period 1955-1967, there was 
a steady decline in support for the Conservatives. However, this sup-
port never fell below 57 per cent. 
During this period, Socialist support was uneven. Socialists 
experienced a ggin in support until the 1960 election. After the 1960 
election, support declined. 
In the prefecture of Kochi, the Communists experienced increasing 
support •. Support jumped 7 per cent between the 1960 and the 1963 elec-
tion. 
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The Komeito ran a candidate in Kochi during the 1967 election. The 
Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast. 
Independents were never strong in Kochi. Independents never polled 
more than 0.5 per cent. 
Kumamoto 
In the prefecture of Kumamoto, during the period 1955-1967, there 
was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. Support for the Conserv-
atives ranged between 67 and 78 per cent. Support never fell below 67 
percent. 
The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support during this 
period. Support fluctuated between 21 and 30 per cent. 
Support for the Communists has been low but steady. The Communists 
have never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Kumamoto in the 
1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in this prefecture. Independents 
polled less than 0.1 per cent of the vote in 1960. 
Oita 
In the prefecture of Oita, d~ring the period 1955-1967, there was 
fluctuating support for the Conservatives. However, during this period, 
the Conservatives never polled less than 62 per cent. 
The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support during this 
period. The range of support for the Socialists was between 22 and 35 
per cent. 
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Support for the Communists has been low but steady. The Communists 
never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Oita during the 
1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Oita. They polled less than 1 per 
cent of the vote in 1958. 
Miyazaki 
In the prefecture of Miyazaki, during _the period 1955-1967, there 
was an overall decrease in support for the Conservatives. However, the 
Conservatives never received less than 59 per cent of the vote during 
this period. 
During this period, there was overall increasing support for the 
Socialists. Support for the Socialists was as high as 37 per cent in 
1967. 
Support for the Communists was low during this period. But, there 
were very small increases in support although the Corrnnunists never 
polled more than 3 per cent of the vote. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Miyazaki during 
the 1967 election. 
Kagoshima 
In the prefecture of Kagoshima, during the period 1955-1967, there 
was an overall decrease in support for the Conservatives. However, the 
Conservatives never received less than 71 per cent ·of the vote during 
that period. 
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The Socialists experienced small increases in support until 1960. 
After 1960, the Socialists experienced small decreases in support. 
The Communists have never been strong in Kagoshima. They never 
received more than 1 per cent of the vote in any election. 
Class IV Prefectures 
These are prefectures that have become Class IV prefectures at some 
point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the 
changes that occurred in support for each party during the period. 
Miyagi 
After the 1965 census, Miyagi changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Miyagi, there was steady support for the Conservative 
party. Support f luc tua ted between 55 and 60 per cent. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives increased 5 
per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 55 per cent. 
During this period, support for the Socialists fluctuated. Support 
varied between 31 and 40 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, 
support for the Socialists declined 5 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was very low during this period. The 
Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the votes in any 
election. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Miyagi during the 
1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were unusually strong in 
Miyagi. Support for miscellaneous candidates and parties ranged between 
1 and 5 per cent. 
Independents were never strong in Miyagi. They polled less than 
1 per cent of the vote during this period. 
Tochigi 
After the 1965 census, Tochigi changed to a Class IV prefecture. 
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In the prefecture of Tochigi, the Conservatives have enjoyed steady sup-
port. When the prefecture changed classes support did drop 4 per cent. 
But, the Conservatives have not received less than 64 per cent of the 
vote in any election during this period. 
The Socialist party enjoyed fluctuating support during the period. 
Support ranged from 30 to 34 per cent. When the prefecture went to 
Class IV, support increased 4 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was very low in Tochigi during this 
period. The Communists never received more than 1 per cent of the vote 
in any election. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in the 1967 election. 
Gunnna 
After the 1965 census, G-Uilllla changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Gunnna, ther2 was somewhat uneven support for the 
Conservatives. Support has ~2ver fallen below 64 per cent, however. 
When the prefecture changed classes, support dropped 3 per cent. 
During this period, supp:irt for the Socialists was uneven. Support 
ranged between 29 and 33 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, 
support increased 2 per cent. 
In this period, there was low but steady support for the Communists. 
Support increased during this period from 0.4 to 4 per cent. When Gumma 
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changed classes, support increased 2 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Gununa in 1967. 
Independents were never strong in Gumma. They never received more 
than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Chiba 
After the 1965 census, Chiba changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Chiba, the Conservatives experienced a steady decline 
in support. However, support for the Conservatives never fell below 
59 per cent. When the prefecture changed to Class IV, support dropped 
10 per cent. 
During this period, there was steady increasing support for the 
Socialists. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 2 per 
cent. 
Support for the Connnunists during this period was less than 3 per 
cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased by 1 per 
cent. 
The Komeito ran a candidate 1n Chiba during the 1967 election. The 
Komeito received 8 per cent of the vote in that election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Chiba. 
The support was negligible; less than 0.1 per cent. 
Independents also have never been strong in Chiba. They never 
received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Toyama 
After the 1965 census, Toyama changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Toyama, the Conservatives experienced an overall 
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decline in support. When the prefecture went to Class IV, support de-
clined 1 per cent. However, support during this period was no lower than 
69 per cent. 
During this period, there was steady support for the Socialists 
with slight increases. When the prefecture changed classes, support 
increased 1 per cent. 
Support for the Communists in this period was less than 3 per cent. 
When the prefecture changed classes, support decreased 1 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Toyama during the 
1967 election. 
Independents have never been strong in Toyama. In the 1963 elec-
tion, Independents received 0.4 per cent of the votes cast. 
Fukui 
After the 1965 census, Fukui changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Fukui, support for the Conservatives was uneven. 
Support dropped 12 per cent when the prefecture when to Class IV. How-
ever, support for the Conservatives never dropped below 60 per cent. 
During this period. there was fluctuating support for the Social-
ists. Support ranged from 27 to 37 per cent. When Fukui changed 
classes, support for the Socialists increased 10 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was very low and uneven. Support was 
never greater than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any election during 
this period. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Fukui during the 
1967 election. 
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Independents have never been strong in Fukui. In 1955, Independents 
only received less than 1 per cent of the vote. 
Yamanashi 
After the 1965 census, Yamanashi changed to a Class IV prefecture. 
In the prefecture of Yamanashi, the Conservatives experienced fluctuat-
ing support. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Con-
servatives dropped 8 per cent. 
During this period, support for the Socialists fluctuated. The 
range of support was between 32 and 40 per cent. When the prefecture 
changed classes, support increased 7 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was very low during this period. The 
Communists never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any 
election. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamanashi during 
the 1967 election. 
Support for Independents has been uneven and low. In 1955, Inde-
pendents received 2 per cent of the vote •. In 1967, Independents 
received 0.2 per cent of the vote. 
Nagano 
After the 1965 census, Nagano changed to a Class IV prefecture. 
In the prefecture of Nagano, support for the Conservatives underwent an 
overall decline. When the prefecture changed classes, support .dropped 
8 per cent. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 47 per cent. 
Socialist support in Nagano was uneven. When the prefecture 
changed classes, support increased 9 per cent. In 1967, there was 
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only 3 per cent of the vote separating the Socialists and the Conserv-
atives. 
Communist support in this prefecture was rather high. Support 
ranged from 4 to 8 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, there 
was no change in support for the Communists. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nagano in the 1967 
election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Nagano. 
In 1955, miscellaneous candidates received 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
And in 1958, they received .. only 0.1 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also have never been strong in Nagano. They have 
never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any election 
during 1955-1967. 
Mie 
After the 1960 census, Mie changed to a Class IV prefecture. In 
the prefecture of Mie, support for the Conservatives was uneven, but 
they did experience an overall decline. When the prefecture changed 
classes, support declined 4 per cent. However, during this period, 
support for the Conservatives did not fall below 68 per cent. 
Support for the Socialists was also uneven during this period. 
When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 3 per cent. 
Communist support in Mie was very low. The Communists never 
received more than 2 per cent of the vote in any election during this 
period. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Mie during the 
1967 election. 
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Miscellaneous candidates and parties consistently received votes 
in the election held during this period. But, they have never received 
more than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Independents have never been strong in Mie. In the 1963 election, 
the Independents received only 0.2 per cent of the votes cast. 
Shiga 
After the 1960 census, Shiga became a Class IV prefecture. In the 
prefecture of Shiga, support for the Conservatives declined. When the 
prefecture went to Class IV, support increased 2 per cent. Support for 
the Conservatives during this period was never below 51 per cent. 
Support for the Socialists increased during the period 1955-1967. 
There was one exception; when the prefecture changed classes support 
declined 2 per cent. In 1967, there was only a 7 per cent difference 
between Conservative support and Socialist support. 
Communist support in Shiga has been steady and low. There have been, 
however, slight increases in support for the Communists during this 
period. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Shiga during the 
1967 election. 
Independents have never been strong in Shiga. They have never 
received more than 1 per cent of the vote in any election during this 
period. 
Okayama 
After the 1965 census, Okayama changed to a Class IV prefecture. 
In the prefecture of Okayama, support for the Conservatives steadily 
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declined during this period. When the prefecture changed to Class IV, 
support for the Conservatives dropped 3 per cent. Even though support 
for the Conservatives declined during this period, support never dropped 
below 58 per cent. 
Support for the Socialists during this period was uneven. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support dropped 5 per cent. 
Communist support in Okayama has been steady but low. Suppor.t for 
the Communists has never been greater than 2 per cent. 
The Komeito ran candidates in the 1967 election. In that election, 
the Komeito received 7 per cent of the votes cast. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Okayama. 
In 1958, they received only 0.1 per cent of the vote. 
Tokushima 
After the 1965 census, Tokushima became a Class IV prefecture. In 
Tokushima, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives dropped 18 per 
cent. However, during this period, support for the Conservatives never 
fell below 61 per cent. 
The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support for the Socialists increased 5 per 
cent. 
The Communists enjoyed very low but steady support in Tokushima. 
The Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the vote.during 
this period. 
The Komeito received 12 per cent of the vote in the 1967 election. 
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Independents were never strong in Tokushima. In the years that 
Independents ran they never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties have been very weak in 
Tokushima. In 1960, they polled only 0.04 per cent of the vote. 
Kagawa 
After the 1965 census, Kagawa became a Class IV prefecture. In 
Kagawa, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. When the prefecture 
changed classes, support increased 2 per cent. Support for the Conserv-
atives during the period 1955-1967 never fell below 60 per cent. 
Support for the Socialists was stable during this period, although 
there were slight variations. When the prefecture changed classes, 
Socialist support declined 3 per cent. 
Communist party support fluctuated during this period. Support 
ranged from a high of 5 per cent to a low of 0.5 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Kagawa during the 
1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Kagawa. In the years that 
Independents ran, they never received more than 0.5 per cent of the 
vote. 
Ehime 
After the 1965 census, Ehime became a Class IV prefecture. In 
Ehime. the Conservatives experienced fluctuating support during this 
period. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conserv-
atives increased 7 per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell 
below 63 per cent. 
The Socialists' support during the 1955-1967 period was uneven. 
When the prefecture changed classes, support decreased 7 per cent. 
The Communists enjoyed low support during 1955-1967. There were 
small increases, but support was never greater than 3 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ehime during the 
1967 election. 
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Independents were never strong in Ehime. In 1963, the Independents 
received only 0.08 per cent of the vote. 
After the 1965 census, Saga became a Class IV prefecture. In Saga, 
support for the Conservatives was uneven. When the prefecture changed 
classes, support for the Conservatives increased 4 per cent. And, 
support for the Conservatives during this period was never below 65 per 
cent. 
Support for the Socialists, during 1955-1967. was uneven. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support for the Socialists dropped 5 per 
cent. 
Support for the Communists was steady but low. During this period, 
support for the Communists was never greater than 2 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Saga during the 
1967 election. 
Nagasaki 
After the 1965 census, Nagasaki became a Class IV prefecture. In 
Nagasaki, the Conservatives' support fluctuated during the period 1955-
1967. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives 
increased 2 per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 
60 per cent. 
Socialist support was uneven during this period. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support decreased 3 per cent. 
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Support for the Communists was steady but low. During this period, 
support for the Communists was never greater than 2 per cent. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nagasaki in the 
1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Nagasaki. Support for the Inde-
pendents was never greater than 0.5 per cent. 
Class III Prefectures 
These are prefectures that have become Class III prefectures at 
some point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of 
the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period. 
Hokkaido 
After the 1965 census, Hokkaido became a Class III prefecture. In 
Hokkaid9, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. There 
was no change in support when the p~ef ecture changed from Class V to 
Class IV. But there was a 4 per cent decrease when the prefecture 
changed to Class III. During this period, support for the Conservatives 
fell as low as 47 per cent. 
Socialist support slightly increased during this period •. When the 
prefecture shifted from Class V to IV, there was no change in support. 
But when the prefecture changed to Class III, support increased 2 per 
cent. 
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Support for the Communists was low and uneven. When the prefecture 
changed from Class V to IV, there was no change in support. But when 
the prefecture changed to Class III, support increased 2 per cent. 
The Komeito received 3 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 elec-
tion. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Hokkaido. 
They never polled more than 0.5 per cent of the votes in the years that 
they ran. 
Independents were also never strong in Hokkaido. In the years 
that they ran, the Independents never received more than 0.6 per cent of 
the vote. 
Saitama 
After the 1965 census, Saitama became a Class III prefecture. In 
Saitama, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. When 
the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Conservatives 
declined 2 per cent. And when the prefecture changed to Class III, sup-
port for the Conservatives again dropped but by 5 per cent. During this 
period, however, support for the Conservatives never fell below 57 per 
cent. 
Socialist support slightly increased during this period. When the 
prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Socialists in-
creased by 2 per cent. But when the prefecture changed to Class III, 
support also declined by 4 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was low during this period, but there 
were small increases. Support increased during this period from 0.5 per 
cent to 5 per cent. There was no change in support when the prefecture 
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changed from Class V to Class IV. When the prefecture changed to Class 
III, support increased by 2 per cent. 
The Komeito received 7 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 elec-
tion. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Saitama. 
In 1958, they polled only 0.5 per cent of the vote. 
Independents were also never strong in Saitarna. In the years that 
they ran, the Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the 
vote. 
Ishikawa 
After the 1965 census, Ishikawa became a Class III prefecture. In 
Ishikawa, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. When 
the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Conservatives 
dropped from 75 to 41 per cent. However, for some unknown reason in 
this election in 1960, there was an abnormally large number of invalid 
votes. When the prefecture changed to Class III, support for the 
Conservatives dropped 2 per cent. During this period, even with the 
abnormal return in 1960, support for the Conservatives did not fall 
below 41 per cent. 
Socialist support, during this period, was uneven. Support for the 
Socialists dropped 3 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. 
Support increased 5 per cent when Ishikawa went to Class III. 
Support for the Communists was uneven during this period, ·it ranged 
from 0.3 to 10 per cent. There was a 1 per cent increase in support 
when the prefecture shifted from Class V to IV. And when the prefecture 
changed to Class III, support declined 5 per cent. 
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The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ishikawa during the 
1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Ishikawa.· In 1967, they polled 
only 0.3 per cent of the vote. 
Gifu 
After the 1965 census, Gifu became a Class III prefecture. In Gifu, 
support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. There was no 
change in support when the prefecture changed from Class V to IV. But 
support dropped 8 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class III. 
During this period, support for the Conservatives never dropped below 61 
per cent. 
Socialist support, during this period, was uneven. There was no 
change in Socialist support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to 
IV. Support did increase 3 per cent when Gifu changed to Class III. 
Support for the Communists was steady but low during this period. 
The Communists never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Gifu. 
There was no change in support when the prefecture changed classes. 
The Komeito received 5 per cent of the vote in the 1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Gifu. In 1967, they polled only 
0.3 per cent of the vote. 
Shizuoka 
After the 1965 census, Shizuoka became a Class III prefecture. In 
Shizuoka, support for the Conservatives declined steadily. Support de-
clined 3 per cent when the prefecture changed from Class IV to III. 
Conservatives, during 1955-1967, received at least 62 per cent of the 
vote. 
Support for the Socialists increased overall during this period. 
There was a slight decline in support of 2 per cent, when Shizuoka 
changed from a Class IV to Class III prefecture. 
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Support for the Communists was steady but low. The Communists never 
polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Shizuoka. There was no 
change in support when the prefecture changed classes. 
The Komeito received 4 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 elec-
tion. 
Independents were never strong in Shizuoka. In the years that they 
ran, the Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the vote. 
Nara 
After the 1965 census, Nara changed to a Class III prefecture. In 
Nara, support for the Conservatives declined steadily during 1955-1967. 
When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support declined 4 per 
cent. Support declined 12 per cent when Nara shifted to a Class III 
prefecture. Conservatives, during this period, received at least 51 
per cent of the vote. 
Support for the Socialists increased steadily during this period. 
When prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support increased 4 per cent. 
It increased 9 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class III. 
Communist support was steady but low. Communists never polled more 
than 2 per cent of the vote in Nara. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nara. in the 1967 
election. 
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Independents were never strong in Nara. In the elections held dur-
ing 1955-1967, Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the 
votes cast. 
Wakayama 
After the 1965 census, Wakayama changed to a Class III prefecture. 
In Wakayama, support for the Conservatives steadily declined during 1955-
1967. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support declined 
1 per cent. And support declined 9 per cent when the prefecture changed 
to Class III. Conservatives received at least 60 per cent of the vote 
during this period. 
Support for the Socialists, during this period, fluctuated. When 
the prefecture changed from Class V to Class IV, support declined 3 per 
cent. But when Wakayama shifted to a Class III prefecture, support in-
creased 8 per cent. 
Communist support was steady but low. The Communists never polled 
more than 4 per cent of the vote in Wakayama. When the prefecture 
changed from Class V to IV, support increased 2 per cent. There was no 
change in support when the prefecture changed to Class III. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Wakayama during 
the 1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Wakayama. In the years that they 
ran, the Independents received less than 1 per cent of the vote. 
Hiroshima 
After the 1965 census, Hiroshima changed to a Class III prefecture. 
In Hiroshima, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. There was no 
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change in support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to Class IV. 
There was a decrease in support of 3 per cent when Hiroshima changed to 
a Class III prefecture. Conservatives, during 1955-1967, received at 
least 68 per cent of the vote. 
Support for the Socialists was also uneven. There was no change in 
support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to Class IV. Support 
declined 2 per cent when Hiroshima became a Class III prefecture. 
Communist support was low but there were slight increases. During 
this period, support for the Cormnunists increased from 0.4 to 3 per cent. 
Support increased 1 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class IV. 
And support also increased 1 per cent when Hiroshima changed to Class 
III. 
The Komeito received 4 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 
election. 
Independents were never strong in Hiroshima. In 1960, the Inde-
pendents received only 0.4 per cent of the vote. 
Yamaguchi 
After the 1965 census, Yamaguchi became a Class III prefecture. 
In Yamaguchi, support for the Conservatives was uneven. Support de-
creased 2 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. But support 
increased 7 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class III. Support 
for the Conservatives, during 1955-1967, never fell below 54 per cent. 
Support for the Socialists was uneven in Yamaguchi. There was an 
increase of 3 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. But 
support declined 8 per cent when Yamaguchi changed to Class III. 
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The Communists enjoyed low but steady support in Yamaguchi. The 
Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the votes cast in any 
election held during 1955-1967. 
The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamaguchi in the 
1967 election. 
Class II Prefectures 
These are prefectures that have become Class II prefectures at some 
point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the 
changes that occurred in support for each party during the period. 
Aichi 
After the 1960 census, Aichi became a Class II prefecture. In 
Aichi, support for the Conservatives declined during the period 1955-
1967. There was no change in support when the prefecture shifted to 
Class II. Support for the Conservatives never fell below SO per cent 
during this period. 
Socialist support in Aichi was uneven. There was no change in 
support when the prefecture changed classes. 
Support for the Communists was steady but low. And there were small 
increases in support. There was no change in support for the Communists 
when the prefecture shifted to Class II. 
The Korneito received 4 per cent of the vote in Aichi during the 1967 
election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Aichi. 
They did, however, consistently run in each election held in Aichi during 
this period. But they never received more than 0.1 per cent of the 
vote. 
Independents also have not been strong in Aichi. They never re-
ceived more than 1 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967. 
Kyoto 
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After the 1960 census, Kyoto became a Class II prefecture. In 
Kyoto, support for the Conservatives steadily declined. When the 
prefecture changed to a Class II prefecture, support dropped 7 per cent. 
During 1955-1967, support for the Conservatives fell as low as 39 per 
cent. 
The Socialists were very strong in Kyoto. When the prefecture 
changed to Class II, support increased 3 per cent. In 1963, the Social-
ists outpolled the Conservatives and in 1967, the Socialists tied the 
Conservatives. 
Communist support in Kyoto was rather high. The range of support 
was between 6 and 14 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, 
support increased 3 per cent. 
The Komeito received 6 per cent of the vote in Kyoto during the 
1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Kyoto. 
In the years that they ran, they never received more than 1 per cent of 
the vote. 
Independents .also were never strong in Kyoto. During the-period 




After the 1965 census, Hyogo changed to a Class II prefecture. In 
Hyogo, support for the Conservatives declined steadily during 1955-1967. 
When the prefecture changed to Class II, support declined 7 per cent. 
Support fell as low as 44 per cent in 1967. 
Support for the Socialists was strong and steady. When Hyogo 
changed to a Class II prefecture, support dropped 2 per cent. 
Connnunist support was low but there were slight increases. Support 
in Hyogo for the Communists ranged from 1 to 5 per cent during this 
period. 
The Komeito received 10 per cent of the votes cast in Hyogo during 
the 1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Hyogo. 
In 1960, they received only 0.08 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also were never strong in Hyogo. During this period, 
Independents did not receive more than 1 per cent of the vote. 
Fukuoka 
After the 1965 census, Fukuoka became a Class II prefecture. In 
Fukuoka, there was uneven support for the Conservatives. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support dropped 6 per cent. Support for the 
Conservatives fell as low as 45 per cent during the period 1955-1967. 
Support for the Socialists was strong in Fukuoka. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support did drop 2 per cent. 
Communist support during this period was low, but there were small 
increases. Support in Fukuoka for the Communists ranged from 2 to 7 
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per cent during this period. 
The Komeito received 8 per cent of the votes cast in Fukuoka during 
the 1967 election. 
Independents were never strong in Fukuoka. They never received 
more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in the elections held during this 
period. 
Class I Prefectures 
These are prefectures .that have become Class I prefectures at some 
point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the 
changes that occurred in support for each party during the period. 
Tokyo 
Tokyo, during the period 1955-1967, remained in a Class I 
prefecture. In Tokyo, the Conservatives were not as strong as they had 
been in other prefectures. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 
37 per cent. Conservative support declined steadily and they were out-
polled by the Socialists in several elections. 
The Socialists were a major force in Tokyo politics during the 
period 1955-1967. Support was uneven, however. 
There was appreciable, steady support for the Communists during this 
period. Support in Tokyo, for the Communists, ranged from 5 to 10 per 
cent. 
The Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast in Tokyo during 
the 1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Tokyo. 
They never received more than 1 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also have never been strong in Tokyo. They never 
received more than 1 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967. 
Kanagawa 
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After the 1965 census, Kanagawa became a Class I prefecture. In 
Kanagawa, Conservative support declined overall. Support for the Con-
servatives fell as low as 37 per cent. When the prefecture changed 
classes, support for the Conservatives dropped 10 per cent. 
Socialist support during the period, 1955-1967, was uneven. But 
the Socialists were a strong force in Kanagawa politics. When the 
prefecture changed classes, support declined 5 per cent. 
Support for the Communists was steady in Kanagawa, about 6 per 
cent. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed to 
Class I. 
The Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast in Kanagawa 
during the 1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Kanagawa. 
During this period, they never received more than 1 per cent of the 
vote. 
Independents also were never strong in Kanagawa with one exception. 
In 1967, Independents received 4 per cent of the vote. 
Osaka 
Osaka, during the period 1955-1967, remained a Class I prefecture. 
In Osaka, the Conservative support declined steadily. Support declined 
as low as 30 per cent. 
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Support for the Socialists was uneven, but they were a major force 
in Osaka politics. The range of support was between 30 and 43 per cent. 
Connnunist support was uneven during this period. But support was 
quite high. Range of support for the Communists was between 8 and 13 
per cent. 
The Komeito received 25 per cent of the vote in Osaka during the 
1967 election. 
Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Osaka. 
In 1960, they only received 0.08 per cent of the vote. 
Independents also were never strong in Osaka. Support for Inde-
pendents was never greater than 1 per cent. 
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